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Abstract
We empirically analyze the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment
insurance and social assistance programs. To do so, we specify a structural life-cycle
model of the labor supply, savings, and social assistance claiming decisions of sin-
gles and married couples. Partial insurance against wage and employment shocks is
provided by social programs, savings, and the labor supplies of all adult household
members. We show that the optimal policy mix is dominated by moderately generous
social assistance, which guarantees a permanent universal minimum household income,
with only a minor role for temporary earnings-related unemployment insurance. The
optimal amount of social assistance is heavily influenced by income pooling in married
households. This pooling provides partial insurance against negative economic shocks,
reducing the optimal generosity of social assistance.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, the ‘social safety net’ combines unemployment insurance with social assis-
tance programs. Broadly speaking, unemployment insurance provides temporary earnings-
related benefits to newly unemployed individuals, while social assistance programs guarantee
households a permanent universal minimum income. Interestingly, the overall generosity of
the social safety net and the relative importance of unemployment insurance and social as-
sistance programs vary considerably across countries. In the United States, unemployment
insurance provides earnings-related income replacement, but assistance benefits are markedly
less generous, and consequently social support falls considerably when unemployment insur-
ance benefits are exhausted. In the United Kingdom, however, essentially all social support is
provided through social assistance: income replacement is universal, stable, and moderately
generous. Many continental European countries, including France and Germany, combine
the two systems: unemployment insurance provides temporary earnings-related benefits and
social assistance programs guarantee all households a minimum income.1
These large differences across countries in the design of the social safety net suggest that
there is little consensus regarding how to best combine unemployment insurance and social
assistance. This motivates the first contribution of this paper, which is to provide empirical
evidence concerning the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and
social assistance.2 In doing so, we extend previous studies that analyze the optimal design
of unemployment insurance or social assistance programs in isolation, e.g., Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997), Saez (2002), Chetty (2006), and Shimer and Werning (2008). It is important
to consider the optimal design of unemployment insurance and social assistance jointly, most
obviously because social assistance provides an income floor that affects the moral hazard
and insurance effects of unemployment insurance.
When studying the optimal design of unemployment insurance and social assistance, it is
also important to account for interactions between the insurance provided by the social safety
net and the intra-household insurance available from labor supply and savings: neglecting
1The OCED tax-benefit model calculates the net replacement rate (ratio of benefits to previous after tax
earnings) for those in the initial phase of unemployment and those in long-term unemployment (see OECD,
2015). In 2014, single individuals without children who previously earned the average wage and who qualified
for social assistance had an initial replacement rate of 59% in Germany, 45% in the US, and 38% in the UK.
In contrast, the long-term replacement rates for the same groups were 38% in the UK, 35% in Germany, and
only 6% in the US. Differences between countries and by the duration of unemployment are similar for other
household types (e.g., married households and households with children).
2The unemployment insurance and social assistance programs that we study interact with each other and
together form a policy instrument that combines insurance and assistance. The distinction that we draw
in the presentation between unemployment insurance and social assistance is motivated by the institutional
rules that govern how the social safety net is organized in practice.
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intra-household insurance will overstate the insurance value of the social safety net thereby
biasing upwards estimates of the optimal generosities of unemployment insurance and social
assistance. Previous studies have typically considered the design of social insurance or social
assistance programs in the presence of intra-household insurance from savings and a single
source of labor supply or earnings. However, empirical findings from the literature suggest
that married couples obtain insurance by adjusting one spouse’s labor supply in response to
employment and wage shocks affecting the other spouse, a pattern known as the added worker
effect (see, e.g., Lundberg, l985, and Cullen and Gruber, 2000, for evidence from the US).3
This paper makes a second contribution by exploring the optimal design of unemployment
insurance and social assistance programs when households have additional intra-household
insurance from spousal labor supply. Specifically, we recognize that married households make
labor supply choices for both spouses–a so-called family labor supply decision (Blundell et al.,
2016b)–and we derive the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance
and social assistance in the presence of intra-household insurance from family labor supply.
We explore the optimal design of the social safety net in the presence of intra-household
insurance from family labor supply by embedding a social insurance and assistance system
in a dynamic structural model of life-cycle labor supply and savings decisions. The life-cycle
model includes: i) a labor supply choice for both members of a married household, which
recognizes intra-household insurance from spousal earnings as substitute for insurance from
social insurance and assistance programs; ii) a social assistance claiming decision, which
allows households to forgo their entitlement to social assistance; iii) a realistic schedule of
progressive income taxation; iv) liquidity constraints that limit the ability of households
to self-insure by dis-saving; v) heterogeneity in education, which generates a redistributive
motive for social programs; and vi) search decisions and endogenous quits, both of which may
be subject to moral hazard effects from social assistance and unemployment insurance. The
model further includes wage risk and employment risk, which generate demand for insurance.
The parameters of the life-cycle model are estimated using indirect inference. Specifi-
cally, the estimation matches predictions from the life-cycle model to behavior in samples
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the German Survey of Income and
3Triebe (2015) replicates this finding using a similar sample to ours from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) and Halla et al. (2018) present similar findings for Austria using administrative data on plant
closures. Fadlon and Nielsen (2015) explore the effects of fatal and non-fatal health shocks on spousal labor
supply. Added worker effects may be driven by nonseparabilities between the spouses’ leisure times (Goux
et al., 2014) or by a preference for income replacement. Both leisure-driven and income-driven added worker
effects imply that the family labor supply decision of married households is relevant to the optimal design
of social insurance and assistance programs. Fadlon and Nielsen (2019) formalize this intuition and propose
using the labor supply response of a spouse who is indirectly affect by a shock to evaluate the welfare gains
from increasing the generosity of government benefits.
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Expenditure (EVS) and to existing evidence on the moral hazard effects of unemployment
insurance from German social security records (as reported in Schmieder et al., 2012). The
estimated life-cycle model has good in-sample fit. Moreover, the estimated life-cycle model
replicates existing reduced-form results on the employment effects of unemployment insur-
ance, the consumption smoothing effect of unemployment insurance, and the added worker
effect. For example, the estimated life-cycle model implies that a 10 percentage point in-
crease in the unemployment insurance replacement rate increases the average time until
re-employment by 0.57–0.94 weeks while a three month (i.e., quarter of a year) increase in
the initial entitlement period for unemployment insurance increases the average time until
re-employment by around 0.1 quarters. These predictions are in line with the findings of, e.g.,
Lalive et al. (2006). Consistent with the consumption smoothing effects of unemployment
insurance found by Gruber (1997), Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016), and Ganong and Noel
(2019), the estimated life-cycle model predicts that a 10 percentage point increase in the
unemployment insurance replacement rate decreases the consumption fall associated with
job loss by 2.3 percentage points. Similarly, aligning with the findings of Halla et al. (2018),
the estimated life-cycle model predicts that the employment rate of married women increases
by around one percentage point in the five years following their husband’s job loss. We take
the consistency of the estimated life-cycle model with previous findings as evidence that the
model is well-suited for analyzing questions concerning the design of social assistance and
unemployment insurance.
We use the estimated life-cycle model to study the optimal design of the social safety
net. For this exercise, we define a baseline policy environment that closely resembles the year
2000 system in Germany: unemployment insurance replaces 60% of lost post-tax earnings for
12-30 months, depending on age; social assistance provides an income floor to wealth-poor
households, starting at around 600 euros per month for a single household without children
and increasing with households size; and income taxation is progressive and based on house-
hold income. Maintaining the baseline tax system, we find that a 5% cut in social assistance
leads to a larger welfare loss than a revenue-equivalent cut in the unemployment insurance
replacement rate (-0.53% versus -0.27% of baseline consumption). We trace the different
welfare effects of the unemployment insurance and social assistance to differences in the in-
surance effects of the two programs: the cut in social assistance generates a larger increase
in consumption uncertainty than the revenue-equivalent cut in unemployment insurance.
Building from this result, we consider the optimal mix of unemployment insurance and
social assistance. In this analysis, we maintain the baseline tax system and restrict attention
to policy reforms that are self-financing in the sense that they are revenue-equivalent to the
baseline policy environment. We find that the optimal mix of unemployment insurance and
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social assistance is characterized by unemployment insurance with a replacement rate of 9%
and a social assistance income floor equal to 133% of the baseline level. The optimal mix,
therefore, focuses on permanent universal social assistance, with little role for temporary
earnings-related unemployment insurance. In this assistance-orientated system, individuals
who recently left employment receive a similar level of social support to those in long-
term unemployment. Overall, the optimal policy mix resembles the UK system, in which
essentially all social support is provided through social assistance.
We then introduce the average tax rate as an additional policy instrument and derive
the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance.
We continue to focus on policy reforms that are revenue-equivalent to the baseline policy
environment, however, the average tax rate can now be adjusted to finance changes in the
generosity of the social safety net. With the average tax rate added to the set of policy
instruments, we find that the optimal generosity of social assistance is 105% of the baseline
level while unemployment insurance is no longer part of the optimal mix. Moving to the op-
timal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance increases
welfare by 2.2% of baseline consumption compared to the baseline policy environment and
by 0.9% of baseline consumption compared to when the optimal mix is derived holding the
average tax rate fixed at the baseline rate.
Our findings about the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance
and social assistance arise from a three-way trade-off between moral hazard, insurance, and
redistribution. We quantify this trade-off by using a welfare decomposition that follows
Koehne and Kuhn (2015) and Michelacci and Ruffo (2015) and find that our results are not
driven by redistributive concerns. The absence of unemployment insurance from the opti-
mal social safety net instead reflects that cuts in unemployment insurance generate modest
welfare losses from reduced insurance that are more than offset by the welfare gains from
lower moral hazard. Interactions between unemployment insurance and social assistance
are important to this result: by guaranteeing a moderately generous minimum income to
wealth-poor households, social assistance attenuates the consumption losses from cuts in
unemployment insurance thereby providing substitute insurance to individuals with limited
means to smooth their own consumption. We further explore the interaction between un-
employment insurance and social assistance by showing that in the absence of meaningful
social assistance the optimal replacement rate for unemployment insurance is 20%; this fig-
ure is comparable to the findings of Gruber (1997), who derives the optimal unemployment
insurance replacement rate in the absence of social assistance.
We show that our results on the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment
insurance and social assistance are robust to varying several ancillary policy parameters,
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including the income exemption for social assistance, the duration of unemployment insur-
ance, and the progressivity of taxation. We also demonstrate that our results are robust
to modifying unemployment insurance by adding rules that typically appear in assistance
benefits, including a wealth test and a spousal earnings test.
Finally, we explore how the presence of married households in the population affects
the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance.
We find that the optimal generosity of social assistance for a society of single households is
166% of the baseline level. The presence of married households in the population therefore
reduces the optimal generosity of social assistance from 166% to 105% of the baseline level.
Unemployment insurance is not part of the optimal social safety net, irrespective of the
marital composition of the population. The effect of married households on the design of the
optimal policy is economically important: ignoring differences between single and married
households when design the optimal policy leads welfare losses of almost 1% of baseline
consumption. We show that income pooling in married households is the most important
mechanism behind the effect of married households on the design of the optimal policy,
explaining almost half of the effect. This finding highlights the importance of intra-household
insurance for optimal policy design.
This paper builds on previous work that has linked optimal program design with em-
pirical estimates of the effects of social insurance and assistance programs on consumption
smoothing, search, and savings decisions. Gruber (1997) explores how the optimal unem-
ployment insurance replacement rate depends on the effect of unemployment insurance on
consumption smoothing and search. More recent studies have used similar approaches to
derive the optimal design of other aspects of unemployment insurance (see, e.g., Schmieder
et al., 2012, Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2016, Kolsrud et al., 2018, and Ganong and Noel, 2019).
Chetty (2008) emphasizes the role of liquidity constraints in driving the optimal provision of
unemployment insurance and Lentz (2009) shows that the optimal unemployment insurance
replacement rate decreases with household wealth. This important role for intra-household
insurance from savings suggests that intra-household insurance from family labor supply
may also be policy relevant. In this vein, Fadlon and Nielsen (2019) propose a framework
for using spousal labor supply to understand the welfare gains from more generous social
insurance. Our results also add to research that emphasizes program interdependencies (see
Keane and Moffitt, 1998, and Chan, 2013), and to a growing literature that makes compar-
isons between insurance-based and assistance-based social programs (see Low et al., 2010,
Saporta-Eksten, 2014, and Low and Pistaferri, 2015).4
4Several papers provide theoretical insights into the optimal design of unemployment insurance: Flemming
(1978) analyzes optimal unemployment insurance with perfect and imperfect capital markets; Shavell and
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Our life-cycle model shares some features with other studies based on structural life-cycle
models. Our approach of jointly modeling labor supply, savings, and wage determination,
along with exogenous marriage and divorce, broadly follows van der Klaauw and Wolpin
(2008) and Adda et al. (2017). Our model follows the literature in how it captures interac-
tions between the contemporaneous incentives presented by social insurance and assistance
programs and the intertemporal incentives to accumulate human capital (see, e.g., Keane
and Wolpin, 1997, Imai and Keane, 2004, Keane, 2016, Blundell et al., 2016a, and Adda
et al., 2017). We also follow the literature in how we model incentives to accumulate entitle-
ment to social insurance programs (see, e.g., French, 2005, Attanasio et al., 2008, De Nardi
et al., 2010, Low et al., 2010, Heathcote et al., 2014, and Low and Pistaferri, 2015).5
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our life-cycle model. Section 3
describes the empirical specification. Section 4 describes the SOEP and EVS datasets and
details our sample selection criteria. Section 5 outlines the estimation method. Section 6
presents our parameter estimates and explores the fit of the model. Section 7 reports our
results on the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and social
assistance and discusses several robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
2 Life-cycle Model
We propose a discrete-time dynamic model of the job search, labor supply, savings, and
social assistance claiming decisions of single and married households over the life cycle. The
decision problem starts when an individual enters the labor force after completing education.
This occurs at age 18 years for individuals without a university degree (low education) or age
23 years for individuals with a university degree (high education). All individuals are single,
childless, and have zero wealth when they enter the labor force. Once in the labor force,
individuals may marry and divorce and women may have children (we do not distinguish
Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Shimer and Werning (2008), and Pavoni (2009) derive the
optimal time path of unemployment insurance benefits; Pavoni et al. (2013) consider the optimal time
path of insurance and assistance benefits when mandatory work and assisted search are policy instruments;
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that the optimal generosity of unemployment insurance depends on
workers’ willingness to accept employment risk; and Shimer and Werning (2007) propose an approach that is
complementary to Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006) and relies on the reservation wage. Michelacci and Ruffo
(2015) derive the optimal age-profile of unemployment insurance benefits. Paserman (2008) and Spinnewijn
(2015) study the optimal design of unemployment insurance with, respectively, hyperbolic discounting and
biased beliefs.
5Blau and Gilleskie (2006) and van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) analyze, respectively, health insur-
ance and pension reforms with two-earner households. While these papers model couples, they focus on
older populations, they do not include employment risk, and they do not compare insurance and assistance
programs or explore the importance of the family unit for policy design.
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between cohabitation and marriage). The decision problem ends when all members of the
household have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years.
Decisions are made quarterly and each period proceeds as follows: i) a single individual
may marry and a married individual may divorce, and a woman may give birth to a child; ii)
an individual who was employed in the previous period may be subject to a job destruction,
which precludes them from working in the current period; iii) wage and preference shocks
are realized; iv) the household chooses a search intensity for each household member who
was non-employed or in education in the previous period; v) an individual who was non-
employed or in education in the previous period receives a job offer with a probability that
is proportional to their search intensity (someone who was employed in the previous period
and not subject to a job destruction receives a job offer without searching); vi) the household
makes labor supply, savings, and social assistance claiming decisions; vii) the household may
be taxed and/or may receive income from social insurance and assistance programs; viii) each
household member enjoys utility that depends on household consumption, the labor supply
outcomes of the household members, the household’s social assistance claiming decision, and
their own search intensity and preference shocks.
2.1 Choice Set
A household chooses a non-negative search intensity for each adult household member who
was non-employed in the previous period. Consumption, equivalently savings, is a continuous
choice variable but is constrained by a borrowing constraint and an intertemporal budget
constraint. A household’s social assistance claiming decision is binary: the household either
claims all available social assistance or it does not claim social assistance. The labor supply
states at the individual level are: non-employment (NE); full-time employment (FT , 40
hours of work per week); retirement (RT ); and, for women only, part-time employment
(PT , 20 hours of work per week). Labor supply choices are constrained by job destructions
and job offers as described in Section 3.2. Retirement is permanent and is feasible from age
60 years for women and age 63 years for men and is compulsory at age 65 years for women
and men. Once all household members have reached age 65 years there are no further
opportunities for search or labor supply decisions. From this point onward, a household’s
consumption is equal to its income from pensions and social assistance plus the annuity value
of the household’s wealth.6
6Our assumptions about individuals’ employment and retirement options are based on legal rules and
empirical regularities in Germany during the sample period. Our assumption about forced retirement at age
65 years reflects that the compulsory retirement age was 65 years and at this age all employment contracts
ended by default. While not prohibited, working beyond age 65 years was rare in practice (the employment
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Marital status is determined by an exogenous process that allows education-based assor-
tative mating. Reflecting the average male-female age difference for newly formed couples in
our SOEP sample, in married households the husband is assumed to be 2.5 years older than
the wife. We only model marriage and divorce prior to men reaching age 65 years (which
corresponds to age 62.5 years for women). We do not attempt to model the response of mar-
riage or divorce to changes in the design of social insurance and assistance programs. This
aspect of our approach is consistent with existing empirical evidence showing that welfare
programs and in-work benefits have little or no effect on marital status (see, e.g., Eissa and
Hoynes, 1998, Ellwood, 2000, and Bitler et al., 2004). For similar reasons, fertility is also
assumed to be exogenous.7
2.2 Preferences
The per-period utility functions for women and men are given by:
UF (mi,j,t, di,t, dj,t, si,t, SAClaimi,j,t) and U
M(mi,j,t, di,t, dj,t, sj,t, SAClaimi,j,t). (1)
In the above, t denotes time, i > 0 denotes the identity of the woman in the household and
j > 0 denotes the identity of the man in the household. To encompass both single-adult and
married households, we use j = 0 to denote the absence of an adult male in female-headed
single household. Likewise, we use i = 0 to denote the absence of an adult female in a male-
headed single household. mi,j,t denotes the household’s consumption. di,t denotes woman i’s
labor supply state and dj,t denotes man j’s labor supply state. If a women is present in the
household, i.e, if the household is a female-headed single household or a married household,
then di,t ∈ {FT, PT,NE,RT} and otherwise di,t = ∅. If a man is present in the household
then dj,t ∈ {FT,NE,RT} and otherwise dj,t = ∅. si,t denotes woman i’s search intensity
and sj,t denotes man j’s search intensity. SAClaimi,j,t ∈ {0, 1} denotes the households social
assistance claiming decision. While omitted from our notation, preferences are also affected
rate for individuals aged 65–70 years in the SOEP data from 1991–2004 is less than 0.3%). Our assumption
that women have the option of retirement at a younger age than men reflects that women could enter
retirement at age 60 years through the “pensions for women” retirement pathway while men did not have
this option. At age 63 years all individuals could enter retirement using the pathway for long-term insured
workers. Regarding the choice set for men, we note that if we extended the model to include part-time work
for men then, given that only 5% of men work part-time, we would estimate a strong distaste for part-time
work for men. Moreover, since the policy reforms that we consider do not particularly affect the relative
attractiveness of part-time and full-time work, we would not expect the rate of part-time work by men to
change depending on the policy environment.
7We specify a flexible process for the arrival probability for a woman’s first child (see Section 5). We then
assume that a second child arrives three years after the first child and no further children are born. Children
reside in their mother’s household until they reach 18 years of age.
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by observed and unobserved individual characteristics as described in Section 3.8
At every point in time, a single woman chooses her search intensity, labor supply, savings,
and social assistance claiming behavior to maximize the expected discounted value of her
lifetime utility, which is given by:
E
 TF∑
τ=t
δτ−tUF (mi,j,τ , di,τ , dj,τ , si,τ , SAClaimi,j,τ )
∣∣∣∣∣∣Φi,τ
 . (2)
In the above, δ is the discount factor, T F denotes the last period of the woman’s life, and
Φi,τ denotes the woman’s information set at time τ . Likewise, at every point in time, a
single man chooses his search intensity, labor supply, savings, and social assistance claiming
behavior to maximize:
E
 TM∑
τ=t
δτ−tUM(mi,j,τ , di,τ , dj,τ , sj,τ , SAClaimi,j,τ )
∣∣∣∣∣∣Φj,τ
 , (3)
where TM denotes the last period of the man’s life and Φj,τ denotes the man’s information set
at time τ . A married household chooses each spouse’s search intensity and labor supply and
the household’s savings and social assistance claiming behavior to maximize the expected
discounted value of a constant-weighted average of the spouses’ discounted lifetime utilities:
E
α TF∑
τ=t
δτ−tUF (mi,j,τ , di,τ , dj,τ , si,τ , SAClaimi,j,τ )+
(1− α)
TM∑
τ=t
δτ−tUM(mi,j,τ , di,τ , dj,τ , sj,τ , SAClaimi,j,τ )
∣∣∣∣∣∣Φi,τ ,Φj,τ
 . (4)
We estimate the weight, α ∈ [0, 1], attached to the woman’s utility in the married household’s
objective function.
2.3 Borrowing and Intertemporal Budget Constraints
Consumption choices are subject to a borrowing constraint that requires that household
wealth, Ai,j,t, is non-negative at all times. This constraint prevents a household from bor-
8Once all household members have reached age 65 years, a married individual also enjoys ‘bequest utility’
of ιbb
F W¯i,j if female or ιbb
MW¯i,j if male, where W¯i,j denotes the value of the household’s wealth in 100,000s
of euros when youngest household member turns 65. Similarly, once reaching age 65 years, a single individual
enjoys bequest utility of bF W¯i,j if female or b
MW¯i,j if male.
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rowing against its future income. Consumption choices are also subject to an intertemporal
budget constraint. In the absence of a marriage or divorce in period t, the household’s
intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
Ai,j,t = Ai,j,t−1 + yi,j,t −mi,j,t − CCi,j,t + PLi,j,t, (5)
where yi,j,t denotes net household income, CCi,j,t denotes childcare costs, and PLi,j,t denotes
parental leave benefits. Marriage augments household wealth by the wealth of the incoming
spouse. In the event of divorce, the household’s wealth is divided equally between the
spouses.9
Based on the German tax and benefit system, the net household income for a married
household is given by:
yi,j,t = Wi,thi,t +Wj,thj,t + rAi,j,t−1 + Pensioni,t + Pensionj,t + CBi,j,t
+UIi,t + UIj,t + SAi,j,t − Taxi,j,t. (6)
In the above: W denotes the hourly wage; h denotes hours of work (and therefore W × h
denotes earnings); r is the interest rate, assumed to be 3% annually (rAi,j,t−1 thus denotes
interest income); Pension denotes pension benefits; CB denotes child benefits; UI denotes
unemployment insurance; SA denotes social assistance; and Tax denotes income tax (in-
cluding social security contributions). The net income for a single household is obtained by
taking (6) and suppressing the earnings, pension, and unemployment insurance of the person
with the opposite gender to that of the single household head.10
The key programs for this paper are unemployment insurance, social assistance, and
income tax. Sections 2.3.1–2.3.3 describe how we model these programs based on the year
2000 legislative rules in Germany.11 Our models of childcare costs, parental leave benefits,
child benefits, and pensions are also respectful of the Germany setting and are described in
Appendix A. Web Appendix A documents the changes to unemployment insurance, social
assistance, and income tax that occurred during the sample period 1991–2004 and shows
that the year 2000 rules provide a good approximation to the year-specific rules.12
9This assumption follows the legal default that applies to divorce proceedings, which stipulates equal
division of wealth accumulated within the marriage.
10We do not model disability benefits (which are part of the pension system). In the model, non-employed
individuals with work-limiting health conditions receive unemployment insurance and/or social assistance.
11The year 2000 rules for unemployment insurance and social assistance are described in Bundesminis-
terium fu¨r Arbeit und Sozialordnung (2000). The rules for taxation and social security contributions are
described in Bundesministerium fu¨r Finanzen (2001). We use the rules for west Germany.
12Labor market reforms starting in 2005, specifically the fourth stage of the so-called “Hartz reforms”,
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2.3.1 Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment insurance provides partial income replacement to eligible and entitled non-
employed individuals. We use the following formula for individual g ∈ {i, j}’s unemployment
insurance:
UIg,t = RR× NWg,t × Eligg,t × 1(Entg,t > 0), (7)
where RR is the replacement rate, NWg,t is the individual’s net earnings in previous em-
ployment (i.e., previous earnings after income tax), Eligg,t is an indicator of eligibility for
unemployment insurance, and 1(Entg,t > 0) is an indicator of the individual having re-
maining entitlement to unemployment insurance. The replacement rate is equal to 0.6 if no
children reside in the individual’s household or 0.67 if one or more children reside in the in-
dividual’s household. Unemployment insurance is capped, however, this is largely irrelevant
because the cap is high relative to earnings.13
An individual’s unemployment insurance entitlement period, Entg,t, is initialized at the
time of entry to non-employment, and is based on age: an individual who is under age 45
years at the start of his or her non-employment spell has an initial entitlement period of 12
months, while individuals entering non-employment at ages 45–46, 47–51, 52–56 and greater
than or equal to 57 years have initial entitlement periods of 18, 21, 24, and 30 months,
respectively.14 The entitlement period evolves through the non-employment spell as follows:
Entg,t = max{Entg,t−1 − 3, 0}. (8)
An individual’s unemployment insurance eligibility, Eligg,t, is determined at the time
of entry to non-employment and is fixed over the non-employment spell. Specifically, an
individual entering non-employment is eligible (Eligg,t = 1) for unemployment insurance
if he or she was employed in both of the previous two periods or entered employment in
the previous period with remaining unemployment insurance entitlement, and otherwise the
considerably changed the design of unemployment insurance and social assistance. We therefore restrict the
sample to the years 1991–2004. For further discussion of the Hartz reforms see, e.g., Launov and Waelde
(2013) and Dustmann et al. (2014).
13Only previous earnings below 51,765 euros per year are considered when calculating unemployment
insurance. In the SOEP sample, only 2.9% of newly non-employed individuals have previous earnings above
this threshold.
14We round down the initial entitlement period to the nearest integer multiple of three months.
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individual is ineligible (Eligg,t = 0).
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Unemployment insurance is paid without regard to the spouse’s earnings and benefits
are not linked to the household’s interest income; therefore, unemployment insurance may
be received by non-employed individuals residing in households with substantial earned or
unearned income. Furthermore, since there is no wealth test, non-employed individuals
receive unemployment insurance benefits irrespective of their ability to smooth the marginal
utility of consumption by dis-saving.
An eligible non-employed individual who exhausts their entitlement to unemployment
insurance is transitioned on to unemployment assistance. Unemployment assistance replaces
53% of the individual’s previous net earnings if no children reside in the individual’s house-
hold. A higher replacement rate of 57% applies if one or more children reside in the in-
dividual’s household. In contrast to unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance is
means-tested against the spouse’s income and is subject to a wealth test.17 The individual
continues to receive unemployment assistance until the means test reduces their benefit to
zero or their household fails the wealth test.
2.3.2 Social Assistance
Social assistance is a universal household benefit that tops up the net income of wealth-poor
households to a level that we call the ‘social assistance income floor’ (SAFloori,j,t). The
social assistance that is available to a wealth-poor household is thus given by:
S˜Ai,j,t = max{SAFloori,j,t − y˜i,j,t, 0}, (9)
15According to the German legislation, individuals who quit their jobs and voluntarily transitioned into
non-employment must wait three months before starting to receive unemployment insurance benefits. We
neglect this rule because eligible individuals are seldom prevented from claiming unemployment insurance
immediately upon entering non-employment. Specifically, our calculations based on administrative data
collected by the German Federal Employment Agency for the year 2000 show that fewer than 5% of eligible
new entrants to unemployment were sanctioned for quitting previous employment (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit,
2013).
16We assume that women who enter non-employment with a child under the age of 24 months and women
who give birth while receiving unemployment insurance forgo their eligibility to unemployment insurance
during that spell of non-employment. Non-employed women who have a child aged under the age of 24
months may instead receive parental leave benefits (see Appendix A).
17Specifically, unemployment assistance is withdrawn one-for-one against the sum of: i) the spouse’s net
taxable earnings (see the notes to Figure 1) above an allowance; ii) the spouse’s unemployment insurance
above the same allowance; and iii) and the spouse’s pension income. The allowance is equal to the imputed
value of the spouse’s unemployment assistance. The wealth test restricts unemployment assistance to single
individuals with wealth below 4,090 euros and married individuals whose household wealth is below 8,181
euros.
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where y˜i,j,t is net household income before social assistance is included.
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The social assistance income floor can be written as:
SAFloori,j,t = G× Ei,j,t. (10)
The equivalence scale, Ei,j,t, is equal to one for a single household without children and
increases with the number of adults and children in the household. The generosity parameter,
G, is equal to 605 euros per month.19 Based on the generosity parameter and the equivalence
scale, the social assistance income floor is equal to, e.g., 605 euros per month for a single
household without children, 906 euros per month for a married household without children,
1,540 euros per month for a married household with two children aged between 7 and 13
years, and 1,198 euros per month for a single woman with a fifteen-year-old child. The
legislation stipulates that social assistance is only available to households with little or no
wealth. We operationalize this by assuming that only single households with wealth below
4,090 euros and married households with wealth below 8,181 euros are eligible for social
assistance.20
Previous studies have documented substantial non-take-up of social assistance in Ger-
18Our empirical analysis includes one further detail that, for simplicity, is omitted from this discussion:
only taxable earnings and taxable interest income are considered when calculating social assistance (for
definitions, see the notes to Figure 1).
19We obtain a value of 605 euros per month for the generosity parameter by summing together 280
euros per month for non-housing assistance and 325 euros per month for housing (both figures are averages
over the states in west Germany). We derive the equivalence scale Ei,j,t by taking a weighted average of the
equivalence scale that is used to calculate non-housing social assistance and the implicit equivalence scale used
to guide the calculation of housing benefits (which we recover from the examples given in Bundesministerium
fu¨r Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 2000), with a weight of 0.463 attached to the non-housing equivalence scale
(corresponding to the share of total assistance for a single household without children that is due to non-
housing assistance). For single households:
Ei,j,t = 1 + 0.25 C0–6i,j,t + 0.30 C7–13i,j,t + 0.42C14–17i,j,t
+ 0.39 OneCi,j,t + 0.56 TwoCi,j,t, (11)
and for married households:
Ei,j,t = 1.59 + 0.23 C0–6i,j,t + 0.30 C7–13i,j,t + 0.42C14–17i,j,t
+ 0.16 OneCi,j,t + 0.30 TwoCi,j,t, (12)
where Cx–yi,j,t denotes the number of children aged between x and y years inclusive in the household,
OneCi,j,t is an indicator for there being exactly one child aged 17 years or younger in the household and
TwoCi,j,t is an indicator for there being exactly two children aged 17 years or younger in the household.
20A household cannot claim social assistance before claiming all entitlements to unemployment insurance
and unemployment assistance. However, if the net income of a household that is receiving unemployment
insurance or unemployment assistance is below the household-specific social assistance income floor, e.g.,
because there are children in the household, then the household may also receive social assistance to raise
the household’s net income up to the level of the social assistance income floor.
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many (see, e.g., Riphahn, 2001). This mirrors welfare benefit claiming behavior internation-
ally. To ensure that the model captures the pattern of social assistance receipt, we allow
households to decide whether or not to claim the social assistance for which they are eligible.
The social assistance that a household actually receives is thus given by:
SAi,j,t = S˜Ai,j,t × ClaimSAi,j,t, (13)
where ClaimSAi,j,t is an indicator for the household choosing to claim social assistance.
Section 3.1 describes the costs of claiming social assistance.
2.3.3 Income Tax
Figure 1 illustrates the progressive income tax schedules for a single individual without
children and a married household with one earner. A single individual with full-time earnings
of 30,608 euros per year (the mean in our sample) faces an average tax rate (including social
security contributions) of 41.9%. Note, income tax (excluding social security contributions)
is based on household income, i.e., taxation is joint: a single household with taxable income
of x and a married household with taxable income of 2x face the same average tax rate on
taxable income.
15
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(b) Married household with one earner
Note: We use the west German rules for the year 2000. Income tax, excluding social security contributions,
is based on taxable household income, which is equal to the taxable earnings of all household members plus
the household’s taxable interest income minus the household’s tax-deductible social security contributions.
Individual earnings in excess of 1,022 euros per year are taxable. Interest income in excess of 1,585 euros
per year for a single household or 3,170 euros per year for a married household is taxable. Social security
contributions up to 2,001 euros per year for a single household or 4,002 euros per year for a married household
may be deducted (even if only one spouse is working). Single parents receive an additional tax free earnings
allowance of 2,871 euros per year. The solidarity surcharge (Solidarita¨tszuschlag) is included in income
tax and is equal to 5.5% of the household’s tax liability, excluding social security contributions. Earnings
are subject to social security contributions at rates of 7.75%, 9.65%, and 3.25% for health, retirement,
and unemployment benefits. Individuals with earnings below 3,865 euros per year are exempt from social
security contributions. Individual earnings above 52,765 euros per year are exempt from social security
contributions for retirement and unemployment benefits and individual earnings above 75% of this amount
(i.e., 39,574 euros per year) are exempt from social security contributions for health benefits. The illustrated
tax schedules are for households with zero interest income.
Figure 1: Income tax schedule
3 Empirical Specification
In this section, we describe the empirical specifications of preferences, job offer and de-
struction probabilities, and wages (the specifications of the marriage, divorce, and fertility
processes are provided in Section 5).
3.1 Preferences
We adopt the following specification a woman’s preferences:
UF (mi,j,t, di,t, dj,t, si,t, SAClaimi,j,t) = u
F (mi,j,t, di,t, dj,t)
−ϕFi,SASAClaimi,j,t −
s2i,t
2
+ εi,t(di,t), (14)
The sub-utility function, uF , captures the systematic component of the woman’s preference
for consumption and the leisure times of the household members. Following Moffitt (1983),
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the woman faces a fixed cost, ϕFi,SA, of claiming social assistance. Social assistance claiming
costs are allowed to vary by marital status with ϕFi,SA = ϕ
F
SA if the woman is single and
ϕFi,SA = ιsa × ϕFSA if the woman is married. Search costs are quadratic. εi,t(di,t) denotes
unobserved preference shocks that are specific to the woman’s labor supply state. The un-
observed preference shocks are assumed to be independent over time, and contemporaneous
preference shocks are assumed to be mutually independent and normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviation ςF .
Our specification of the sub-utility function is motivated by two established empirical
regularities: i) there are important nonseparabilities between consumption and leisure (see,
e.g., Browning and Meghir, 1991, and Attanasio and Weber, 1995); and ii) there are sub-
stantial intra-household cross-spouse correlations in employment and retirement decisions.21
The former of these regularities largely accounts for the popularity of the single-agent pref-
erence specification used by, e.g., French and Jones (2011), which allows nonseparability
between consumption and the individual’s own leisure time; we extend the same preference
specification to allow nonseparability between the spouses’ leisure times.
In particular, we specify that:
uF (mi,j,t, di,t, dj,t) =
(ηF (di,t, dj,t)mi,j,t/Ei,j,t)
1− ρF
1−ρF
, (15)
where ρF is the coefficient of relative risk aversion for women and Ei,j,t is the household
equivalence scale that is implicit in the German social assistance system (see footnote 19).
Consumption therefore is a household public good subject to congestion as household size
increases. The woman’s taste for consumption, ηF (di,t, dj,t), depends on the household labor
supply outcome and on demographic variables as follows:
log ηF (di,t, dj,t) = η
F
FT,SXi,t × FTi,t × Singlei,t + ηFPT,SXi,t × PTi,t × Singlei,t +
ηFFT,CXi,t × FTi,t ×Marriedi,t + ηFPT,CXi,t × PTi,t ×Marriedi,t +
ηC1(di,t = NE ∪ di,t = RT )× `(dj,t). (16)
In the above, FTi,t is an indicator for the woman working full-time, PTi,t is an indicator for
the woman working part-time, Singlei,t is an indicator for the woman being single, Marriedi,t
is an indicator for the woman being married, and Xi,t is a vector of demographics that may
21Gregg et al. (2010) find polarization of employment across households in several countries including
Germany and the US. Relatedly, spouses are frequently observed to retire together (see Blau, 1998, and
Coile, 2004). Important motivation for our specification comes from the results of Gustman and Steinmeier
(2004), Casanova (2010), and Blundell et al. (2016b) who show that complementarity between spouses’
leisure times plays a critical role in explaining couples’ employment behavior.
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shift consumption and leisure preferences. Specifically,
Xi,t = [1− AgeG50i,t,AgeG50i,t,Child 0-3i,t,Child 3-6i,t],
where AgeG50i,t is an indicator for the woman being aged 50 years or older, Child 0-3i,t is
an indicator for the youngest child in the household being aged under 3 years, Child 3-6i,t is
an indicator for the youngest child in the household being aged between 3 and 6 years. ηFFT,S
and ηFPT,S measure a single woman’s taste for consumption when working full-time and part-
time, respectively, relative to her taste for consumption when not working. ηFFT,M and η
F
PT,M
are the corresponding preference parameters for a married woman. Finally, the parameter
ηC captures how a woman’s preference for non-work depends on her spouse’s leisure time,
`(dj,t).
22 We interpret ηC as the strength of between-spouse leisure complementarities. The
utility function for men takes the same form as for women, except that child-related variables
are omitted from men’s preferences.
3.2 Job Offer and Job Destruction Probabilities
Recall, job offers arise endogenously, depending on an individual’s search intensity. Specif-
ically, a woman who was employed in the previous period and who is not subject to a job
destruction receives a job offer without searching while a woman who was non-employed or
in education in the previous period and who searches with intensity si,t ∈
[
0, 1
χi,t
]
receives a
job offer with probability:
P Fi,t = χi,tsi,t, (17)
where χi,t denotes the woman’s search productivity. Search productivity takes the following
form:
log(χi,t) = χ
F
1 + χ
F
2 AgeG50i,t + χ
F
3 HiEduci + χ
F
4 Marriedi,t, (18)
where HiEduci is an indicator for the woman having a university degree. The correspond-
ing job-offer probability a man is obtained by replacing F with M and i with j in (17)
and (18). Job destructions, meanwhile, are exogenous and occur with a probability that
depends fully flexibly on the individual’s gender, age category, education, and marital sta-
tus. Job destructions are assumed to be independent across spouses, conditional on age and
22The spouse’s leisure time is normalized to 1.0 for a non-working spouse, 0.5 for a part-time working
spouse, and zero a for full-time working spouse. Spousal leisure time is zero for a single individual.
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education.
3.3 Wages
An individual’s market wages depend on his or her experience, education, and unobserved
productivity. Sample wage observations are mismeasured variants of market wages. Since
wages are only observed for individuals in employment, the distribution of accepted wages
will be different from the distribution of market wages. As explained in Section 5, we obtain
estimates of the parameters of the market wage process by jointly modeling wages and labor
supply and making use of exclusion variables, which affect labor supply but not market
wages, to parse out the selection process.
In more detail, the sampled log real market wage of woman i at time t is given by:
log W˜i,t = logWi,t + νi,t, (19)
= βF1 + β
F
2 Expi,t + β
F
3 HiEduci + β
F
4 κi,t + νi,t, (20)
where Expi,t denotes the woman’s experience (in years), κi,t denotes the woman’s unobserved
productivity, and νi,t is measurement error. Experience is zero at the time of entry into the
labor force from education, and increases by 0.25 for each period of full-time work and 0.125
for each period of part-time work. Unobserved productivity, κi,t, may be transitory, persis-
tent or permanent. In particular, we assume that individuals are subject to productivity
shocks leading κi,t ∈ {0, 1} to evolve according to:
κi,t = 1(θ
F
0 (1− κi,t−1)− θF1 κi,t−1 + i,t ≥ 0), (21)
where i,t is assumed to be serially independent at the individual level with i,t ∼ N(0, 1).
To aid interpretation, we note that a woman with low unobserved productivity experiences
a good productivity shock with probability Φ(θF0 ) while a woman with high unobserved
productivity experiences a bad productivity shock with probability Φ(θF1 ), where Φ() denotes
the standard normal distribution function.23 Measurement error, νi,t, affects the sampled
wage but not the market wage. Measurement errors are assumed to occur independently
23An individual’s initial unobserved productivity is drawn from the steady state distribution of unobserved
productivity. In the steady state, a proportion ΘF of women have high unobserved productivity (κ = 1),
where
ΘF =
Φ(θF0 )
Φ(θF0 ) + Φ(θ
F
1 )
. (22)
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over time and over spouses with νi,t ∼ N(0, σ2νF ).
The wage process for men is obtained by replacing F with M and i with j in (19), (20),
and (21). Note, all parameters of the wage process may vary by gender. This aspect of
the specification captures gender differences in labor market conditions and labor market-
related behaviors. A difference in the probability of a positive wage shock by gender, for
example, may result from gender differences in risk taking, competitiveness or occupational
choice, among other mechanisms. In addition, in the spirit of Attanasio et al. (2008) and
Blundell et al. (2016b), we allow contemporaneous productivity shocks to be correlated
between spouses in the same household. Specifically, we assume corr(i,t, j,t) = %. Non-
contemporaneous shocks to unobserved productivity are assumed to be independent across
spouses.24
4 Data and Sample
Estimation is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the German Survey
of Income and Expenditure (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS).25 Both data
sources are designed to be representative of the German population. The SOEP provides
panel data on a variety of household and individual characteristics including employment,
marriage and cohabitation, age, experience, education, wages, children, and benefit receipt.
The SOEP also includes information about wealth, however, the SOEP lacks detailed infor-
mation on savings. We therefore follow Adda et al. (2017) and supplement the SOEP with
information on savings from the EVS. The EVS is a repeated cross-sectional survey that
includes information on household savings, wealth, employment, and demographic charac-
teristics.26 In the remainder of this section, we describe the SOEP and EVS samples. In Web
Appendix C we establish comparability of the SOEP and EVS samples by showing that de-
mographic characteristics, wealth, and employment behavior are similar in the two samples.
Based on the SOEP datasets, we construct a quarterly panel sample of west German
households that covers the years 1991–2004.27 Following the model, the SOEP sample com-
prises female-headed single households, male-headed single households, and married house-
holds. For married households, we randomly designate one spouse as the household head.
24The household is assumed to have no information, beyond that given above, about the values of future
market wage shocks. Blundell et al. (2016b) find little evidence of anticipation of wage shocks; for further
discussion see Blundell and Preston (1998), Pistaferri (2001, 2003) and Guvenen (2007).
25Estimation also uses information on the employment effects of unemployment insurance from German
social security records. Section 5 explains how we take the required information from the literature.
26See Wagner et al. (2007) for a description of the SOEP and Statistisches Bundesamt (2008) for further
details about the EVS.
27As discussed in footnote 12, the sample ends before the fourth stage of the Hartz reforms.
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All Single women Single men Married women Married men
Share 0.16 0.12 0.36 0.36
Age (years) 44.30 43.07 40.49 43.84 46.57
High education 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.07 0.15
Experience 16.69 14.01 15.52 12.19 22.80
Child 0–3 0.08 0.03 - 0.10 0.10
Child 3–6 0.07 0.04 - 0.09 0.09
Part-time employed 0.13 0.14 - 0.30 -
Full-time employed 0.54 0.51 0.79 0.25 0.75
Retired 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.09
Non-employed 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.39 0.16
Non-employed households 0.11 0.23 0.17 0.08 0.08
Wage (Euros per hour) 14.72 13.19 15.66 11.60 17.13
Rate of Social Assistance receipt 0.12 0.22 0.05 0.08 0.08
(Non-employed households)
Unique household observations 10,217 2,753 2,209 6,882 6,882
Individual-quarter observations 359,013 42,004 28,461 144,274 144,274
Observations of wage 43,052 4,736 3,842 14,031 20,443
Observations of wealth 7,866 947 639 3,140 3,140
Notes: Share is the (weighted) fraction of single women, single men, married women, or married men in
the sample. High education is defined as a university degree. Child 0–3 is an indicator for the youngest
child in the household being aged under 3 years. Child 3–6 is an indicator for the youngest child in the
household being aged between 3 and 6 years. Labor force status (full-time employed, part-time employed,
non-employed, retired) is defined by individual’s situation in the first month of the quarter. A non-
employed household is a household where all individuals are non-employed. The hourly wage is defined as
gross earnings, including overtime pay, in the month prior to the survey divided by contractual working
hours, including hours of paid overtime, during the same period. Wages are therefore observed only for
individuals who were employed in the month prior to the survey. Wage is expressed in year 2000 prices
using the Consumer Price Index. All statistics are weighted using the household weights supplied by the
SOEP.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the SOEP sample
The SOEP sample is restricted to household-quarter observations where the household head
is aged 18–65 years. Additionally, we exclude household-quarter observations where the
household head or head’s spouse is: in education; a university graduate aged under 23 years;
self-employed; or employed by the Civil Service. Finally, to avoid extreme outliers, we ex-
clude the households with wealth in the top or bottom 1% of the surveyed values of wealth.
The SOEP sample contains 10,217 unique households and 359,013 individual-quarter-year
observations. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the variables that we use in the
indirect inference estimation of the structural model.
From the EVS data, we construct a repeated cross-sectional sample of quarterly household
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Single women Single men Married households
All households 0.09 0.16 0.14
Age<50 years 0.10 0.16 0.15
Age≥50 years 0.08 0.13 0.11
High education 0.11 0.17 0.15
Low education 0.09 0.15 0.13
Number of households 8,748 4,033 26,512
Note: All statistics are for non-retired households. Statistics by age and education
for married households are based on the characteristics of the husband. The sav-
ing rate is defined as quarterly household savings divided by net household income
during a ‘reference quarter’. Quarterly household savings is the difference between a
household’s spending on financial and tangible assets (including housing) and its rev-
enue from the same assets classes during the reference quarter. Quarterly household
savings includes loan repayments and revenue from new loans during the reference
quarter. Net household income is reported in the EVS and accounts for all com-
ponents of household income, including transfers, social security contributions, and
income taxation.
Table 2: Saving rates in the EVS sample
saving rates for the years 1998 and 2003.28 We form the EVS sample using the same selection
criteria as we used to construct the SOEP sample, excluding households with extreme levels
of wealth. In addition, we exclude households with quarterly savings or net income in the
bottom or top 1% of the surveyed values of the respective variable. Table 2 summarizes the
saving rates of single women, single men, and married households in the EVS sample.
5 Estimation Method
Estimation proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, we use the SOEP sample to estimate
the strength of education-based assortative mating, rates of marriage, divorce, and births
over the life cycle, and job destruction probabilities.29
28Although the 1993 EVS also falls within the time period covered by the SOEP sample, we do not use
this dataset because the 1993 survey asked about savings during a one year period instead of the quarterly
time frame used in the 1998 and 2003 surveys.
29We estimate the strength education-based assortative mating by calculating the empirical probability
that an individual’s spouse has a university degree, conditional on the individual’s own education. We use
Lowess regressions to estimate marriage rates by age, gender and education, divorce rates by age and the
spouses’ education, and brith rates by age, education and marital status. We use the transitions out of
employment where we observe the reason for the transition to calculate the share of transitions that are
involuntary and then multiply this by the empirical probability of transition out of employment to derive
job destruction probabilities. We define involuntary separations as separations due to layoff, plant closure,
or the termination of a temporary contract.
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In the second stage of the estimation, we use indirect inference to estimate the parameters
in preferences, search productivity, and wages. Intuitively, we specify an auxiliary model that
summarizes important aspects of observed (i.e., actual) behavior and behavior in a sample
that we simulate using the decision rules and other equations of motion given by the life-cycle
model. Parameter values then are chosen to maximize the similarity between the observed
and simulated behaviors, as viewed from the perspective of the auxiliary model. Formally,
let ω denote the collection of parameters to be estimated in the second stage. The indirect
inference estimator of ω is given by:
ω̂ = argmin
ω
(
ψ̂ − ψ̂(ω)
)′
Σ
(
ψ̂ − ψ̂(ω)
)
, (23)
where ψ̂ denotes the auxiliary model parameter estimates based on observed behavior, in-
cluding estimates that we obtain from our SOEP and EVS samples and estimates from
German social security records reported in the literature, ψ̂(ω) denotes the auxiliary model
parameter estimates obtained using a sample simulated from the life-cycle model with pa-
rameter values ω, and Σ is a diagonal weighting matrix.30 We obtain standard errors using
the formula provided by Gourieroux et al. (1993). See Smith, Jr (1993), Gourieroux et al.
(1993), and Gallant and Tauchen (1996) for a more general discussion of Indirect Inference.
We estimate the 55 parameters that appear in preferences, search productivity, and wages
by matching 75 auxiliary model parameters. Each auxiliary model parameter summarizes
a feature of labor supply, savings, social assistance receipt, or wages. Table 3 describes the
auxiliary model parameters and lists the model parameters that are primarily identified by
each group of auxiliary model parameters.
We discuss two important aspects of the auxiliary model. First, since wages are observed
only for individuals in employment, it is important that the auxiliary model includes infor-
mation that separates selection effects from wage determinants. Specifically, the auxiliary
model should summarize how observed wages vary with at least one exclusion variable that
affects employment but does not enter the wage process. In our setting, children, marital
status, spousal education, and spousal experience satisfy the criteria for exclusion variables.
30When simulating samples from the life-cycle model, we plug in our estimates of the marriage, divorce,
and birth rates, strength of assortative mating, and job destruction probabilities. The weighting matrix
has diagonal elements that are inversely proportional to the variances of the auxiliary model parameters.
Variances for the auxiliary model parameter that we obtain from our SOEP and EVS samples are estimated
using bootstrapping with household-level clustering. Variances for the auxiliary model parameters that we
take from the literature are calculated from the standard errors that accompany the published estimates.
We upweight by a factor of ten three groups of auxiliary model parameters that are particularly important,
namely, the employment effects of unemployment insurance, the social assistance receipt rates, and the
sample analogues of the wage shock probabilities; this improves the numerical performance of the estimation
routine.
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Description Auxiliary model
For #
Primarily
(Source) parameters identifying
Voluntary quit rate (SOEP)
Coefficients from logit regressions of voluntary quits
on demographics.
SF CF
SM CM
16 ηFFT,S η
F
FT,C
ηMFT,S η
M
FT,C
Transition rate into employ-
ment (SOEP)
Coefficients from logit regressions of transitions into
employment on demographics.
SF CF
SM CM
16 χF χM
Part-time employment rate
for the previously employed
(SOEP)
Coefficient from logit regressions of part-time em-
ployment on demographics.
SF CF 10 ηFPT,S η
F
PT,C
Employment effect of unem-
ployment insurance (German
social security records)
Effect of a 6 month extension of unemployment in-
surance benefits on the time until reemployment (as
reported by Schmieder et al., 2012).
F M 2 ςF ςM
Joint leisure time (SOEP) Between-spouse leisure correlation. Log odds ratio of
the proportion of childless married households with
wife non-employed and husband employed.
C 2 α ηC
Saving rates (EVS) Quarterly saving rate for households where the head
(if single) or husband (if married) is: i) aged under
50; ii) age 50 or older; and iii) highly educated.
SF SM
C
9 ρF ρM
bF bM
ιb
Social assistance receipt
rates (SOEP)
Log odds ratio of the social assistance receipt rate. SF SM
C
3 ϕFSA ϕ
M
SA
ιsa
Wage regressions (SOEP) Coefficients from OLS regressions of log wage on an
intercept, high education, and experience.
F M 6 βF1 β
F
2 β
F
3
βM1 β
M
2 β
M
3
Summary of wage residuals
(SOEP)
Correlation between predicted employment and the
wage residual. Approximate sample analogues of
wage shock probability, difference between probabil-
ities of good and bad wage shocks, wage shock size,
and variance of wage measurement error.
F M 10 θF0 θ
M
0
θF1 θ
M
1
βF4 β
M
4
σνF σνM
Between-spouse correlation of wage residuals. C 1 %
Note: Demographic variables are indicators for age<50 years, age≥50 years, high education, and (for women)
indicators for the age category of the youngest child. High education is a university degree. S, C, F, and M
denote, respectively, single, married, female, and male.
Table 3: Description of the auxiliary model
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We use all of these exclusion variables, along with education and experience, to predict the
probability of employment for each observation, separating the estimation by gender. We
then include in the auxiliary model the correlation between the predicted probability of
employment and the residualized wage.31
Second, given the focus of this paper on the design of unemployment insurance, it is im-
portant that the auxiliary model is formulated to ensure a strong empirical foundation for the
employment effect of unemployment insurance predicted by the estimated life-cycle model.
In the life-cycle model, the employment effect of unemployment insurance depends on the
effect of unemployment insurance on utility and the productivity of job search. The effect
of unemployment insurance on utility, in turn, depends on risk aversion, the employment-
state-specific taste for consumption, and the scale of the preference shocks (note, the scale
of the preference shocks controls the importance of consumption in utility compared to
the preference shocks). We identify risk aversion from the saving rate. We identify the
employment-state-specific taste from the labor supply choices of individuals who were em-
ployed in the previous period and are not subject to a job destruction. These individuals
face an unconstrained labor supply problem and therefore their behavior maps directly to
preferences.
We use two further empirical quantities to jointly identify the productivity of job search
and the scale of the preference shocks. First, the auxiliary model includes the rate of tran-
sition from non-employment into employment, split by the variables that affect search pro-
ductivity (age, education, gender, and marital status). Second, the auxiliary model includes
estimates of the employment effects of unemployment insurance from German social secu-
rity records. We take these estimates from Schmieder et al. (2012), who find that a 6-month
extension in the initial entitlement period for unemployment insurance benefits increase the
average duration until reemployment by 0.94 months for women and 0.64 months for men.
The estimates of the employment effect of unemployment insurance directly inform on the
importance of unemployment insurance in utility and, therefore, distinguish the determinants
of search productivity from preference parameters.
6 Estimation Results
In this section, we present our estimates of the parameters of the life-cycle model, demon-
strate the model’s good in-sample fit, and show that implications of the model are consistent
31The wage exclusions are strongly statistically significant: the p-value for the correlation between pre-
dicted employment and the residualized wage in the SOEP sample is equal to 0.001 for women and 0.000 for
men.
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with previous studies.
6.1 Parameter Estimates
Figure 7 in Appendix B illustrates the estimated rates of marriages, divorces, and births over
the life cycle. In line with the previous literature, we find that women tend to marry younger
than men and the risk of divorce falls with age. The estimated birth probabilities are higher
for married women than for single women and, conditional on marital status, decrease with
education. Table 13 in Appendix B presents our estimates of the assortative mating process.
We find strong education-based assortative mating. Table 4 presents our estimates of the job
destruction probabilities. The probability of a job destruction falls with education, increases
with age, and tends to be higher for women than for men. Marital status has no systematic
effect on the probability of a job destruction.
Single individuals Married individuals
Women Men Women Men
High education and age≥50 years 0.004 0.005 0.016 0.011
High education and age<50 years 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.002
Low education and age≥50 years 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.013
Low education and age<50 years 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.005
Table 4: Quarterly job destruction probabilities
Women Men
Intercept (βF1 , β
M
1 ) 2.290
(0.044)
2.568
(0.030)
Experience/40 (βF2 , β
M
2 ) 0.086
(0.056)
0.170
(0.035)
High education (βF3 , β
M
3 ) 0.505
(0.037)
0.382
(0.038)
P(κt = 1 | κt−1 = 0) (Φ(θF1 ),Φ(θM1 )) 0.007
(0.001)
0.006
(0.001)
P(κt = 0 | κt−1 = 1) (Φ(θF0 ),Φ(θM0 )) 0.006
(0.001)
0.005
(0.001)
Loading on persistent unobservable (βF4 , β
M
4 ) 0.668
(0.025)
0.621
(0.015)
Standard deviation of measurement error (σνF , σνM ) 0.173
(0.015)
0.137
(0.014)
Between-spouse correlation of persistent wage shocks (%) 0.865
(0.042)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Φ() denotes the standard normal distribution function.
Table 5: Wage equation
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Table 5 presents our estimates of the parameters in the wage equation. We find that the
market wage increases with education and experience. The unobserved component of the
market wage is persistent, with wage shocks being large, infrequent, and correlated between
spouses. Based on our estimates, we calculate that the standard deviation of (annualized)
wage shocks is equal to 0.1049 log points for women and 0.0933 log points for men; these
figures are in line with the results for Germany reported by Krueger et al. (2010) and Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln et al. (2010).
Women Men
Intercept (χF1 , χ
M
1 ) −2.493
(0.056)
−2.711
(0.086)
Age ≥ 50 (χF2 , χM2 ) −0.821
(0.131)
−1.176
(0.110)
High education (χF3 , χ
M
3 ) 0.261
(0.050)
0.213
(0.048)
Married (χF4 , χ
M
4 ) −0.223
(0.062)
−0.022
(0.039)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7: Search productivity
Table 6 presents our estimates of the preference parameters. Panel I reports the esti-
mates of the taste for consumption when employed. The negative estimates for individuals
aged below 50 years and 50 years and older imply disutility from working, irrespective of
hours, gender, age, or marital status. The disutility of full-time work varies from 14% of
consumption for single men aged 50 years or older to 82% of consumption for married women
aged under 50 years. The disutility of part-time work varies from 50% of consumption for
married women aged 50 years or older to 84% of consumption for single women aged 50 years
or older. For women, young children increase the disutility of full-time work but decreases
the disutility of part-time work. Panel II shows that the CRRA is estimated to be 1.935 for
women and 1.786 for men. These figures are in line with previous studies, which typically
report estimates of the CRRA in the range of 1–3 (see, e.g., Attanasio and Weber, 1995).
Panel II also shows that individuals experience significant disutility if they claim social assis-
tance and receive significant bequest utility. Panel III reports further preference parameters
that are specific to married households. Notably, we find significant between-spouse leisure
complementarity, with a non-working spouse estimated to increase the utility of consump-
tion when not working by 11.3%. Women and men receive approximately equal weight in
married households. Marriage decreases the cost of claiming social assistance and increases
the bequest motive. Table 7 shows that search productivity decreases with age, increases
with education, and is lower for married individuals than for singles.
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I: Taste for consumption when employed
Single women Married women Single men Married men
Full-time employment (ηFFT,S , η
F
FT,C , η
M
FT,S , η
M
FT,C):
Age<50 −0.645
(0.043)
−1.262
(0.059)
−0.146
(0.055)
−0.286
(0.056)
Age≥50 −0.867
(0.116)
−1.718
(0.104)
−0.205
(0.099)
−0.837
(0.108)
Youngest child aged < 3 −0.395
(0.188)
−0.729
(0.076)
– –
3 ≤ Youngest child aged < 6 −0.949
(0.070)
−0.678
(0.202)
– –
Part-time employment (ηFPT,S , η
F
PT,C):
Age<50 −1.605
(0.068)
−1.012
(0.046)
– –
Age≥50 −1.814
(0.121)
−0.693
(0.086)
– –
Youngest child aged < 3 0.684
(0.328)
0.841
(0.064)
– –
3 ≤ Youngest child aged <6 0.904
(0.161)
1.131
(0.786)
– –
II: Further preference parameters for women and men
Women Men
CRRA (ρF , ρM ) 1.935
(0.040)
1.786
(0.118)
Scale of preference shocks (ςF , ςM ) 3.365
(0.023)
5.086
(0.044)
Social assistance stigma (ϕFSA, ϕ
M
SA) −1.294
(0.169
−3.120
(0.588)
Bequest utility (bF , bM ) 1.797
(0.249)
3.738
(0.566)
III: Further preference parameters for married households
Between-spouse leisure complementarity (ηC) 0.113
(0.006)
Weight on female spouse (α) 0.492
(0.026)
Social assistance stigma relative to singles (ιsa) 0.447
(0.073)
Bequest utility relative to singles (ιb) 2.750
(0.315)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6: Preference parameters
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6.2 In-Sample Goodness of Fit
Table 14 in Appendix C shows that the estimated life-cycle model obtains a close fit to the
features of labor supply, social assistance receipt, savings, and wages that were targeted in
the estimation. In terms of labor supply, the estimated life-cycle model fits the patterns of
voluntary quits, transitions into employment, and part-time work by age, gender, education,
and children that we observe in the SOEP sample. The estimated life-cycle model replicates
closely the joint labor supply behavior of married couples, e.g., the correlation between
spouses’ leisure times is 0.29 in the SOEP sample while the estimated life-cycle model implies
a figure of 0.25. The estimated life-cycle model obtains a good fit to the rates of social
assistance receipt in the SOEP sample of 22%, 5%, and 8% for single women, single men,
and married households, respectively; the corresponding figures based on the estimated life-
cycle model are 22%, 7%, and 8%. As an aside, we note that the estimated life-cycle model
suggests that 48% of households choose not to claim social assistance despite being eligible.
Since the SOEP does not include information on benefit eligibility, we do not have a sample
analogue for this prediction. However, a non-take-up rate of 48% is consistent with previous
studies of benefit take-up in Germany including Kayser and Frick (2000) and Riphahn (2001)
who report non-take-up rates of 52.3% and 63.1%, respectively. Furthermore, the estimated
life-cycle model does a good job at fitting savings behavior and wages; for instance the
saving rate for married households where the husband aged 50 year or older is 11% both in
the EVS sample and according to the estimated life-cycle model, and the partial effect of
high education on the log wage is 0.34 for women and 0.42 for men in the SOEP sample,
compared to 0.31 and 0.35 according to the estimated life-cycle model.
We move beyond the quantities matched in the estimation to show that the estimated
life-cycle model targets benefit receipt in a way that is consistent with behavior in the SOEP
sample. Table 15 in Appendix C compares the characteristics of social assistance and un-
employment insurance recipients in the SOEP sample with the characteristics of individuals
who are predicted to receive social assistance or unemployment insurance based on the es-
timated life-cycle model. The estimated life-cycle model fits the observed concentration of
social assistance on single women and the observed higher rates of unemployment insurance
receipt among married individuals compared to singles. The estimated life-cycle model also
fits the higher observed average age of unemployment insurance recipients compared to social
assistance recipients.
29
6.3 Consistency with Previous Studies
In the spirit of, e.g., Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Low and Pistaferri (2015), we assess the
validity of the estimated life-cycle model by comparing the model’s implications with find-
ings from related reduced-form studies. We perform model validation on three dimensions:
the employment effects of unemployment insurance; the consumption smoothing effect of
unemployment insurance; and the added worker effect.
6.3.1 The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Employment
We show that the estimated life-cycle model implies that employment depends on key pa-
rameters of the unemployment insurance system in a way that is consistent with findings
from reduced-form studies that exploit plausibly exogenous variation in benefit rules. Sum-
marizing briefly, prior work suggests that a one-week increase in the unemployment insurance
entitlement period increases the time until re-employment by 0.05–0.15 weeks.32 Regarding
the level of benefits, reduced-form evidence is less plentiful and more mixed. Prior research
suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate increases the time until
re-employment by 0.5–1.5 weeks, and reports elasticities ranging from 0.15 to above 2 (Card
et al., 2015, survey recent findings).33
Based on the estimated life-cycle model, we derive marginal effects mirroring those re-
ported in the reduced-form literature. Specifically, using the unemployment insurance system
described in Section 2.3.1, we simulate inflow samples of unemployment insurance-eligible
individuals entering non-employment at ages 20, 30, and 40 years. Subsequent employment
32Relevant prior evidence includes the estimates of Schmieder et al. (2012) for Germany that we used as
targets for the estimation (see Section 5) and Lalive et al. (2006)’s results for Austria. Using a difference-
in-differences approach, Lalive et al. (2006) find that a one-week increase in the initial entitlement period
increases the average time until re-employment by 0.05 weeks at age 40–49 years and 0.1 weeks at age 50
years and above. Also see the surveys by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) and Tatsiramos and van Ours
(2014).
33Using a difference-in-differences approach and data from Austria, Lalive et al. (2006) report that a 6
percentage point increase in the replacement rate increases the average duration of non-employment 0.38
weeks. Using a regression kink design, Landais (2015) finds elasticities for the duration of benefit claims
with respect to the replacement rate of between 0.2–0.7 for the US. Card et al. (2015) report elasticities for
the time until re-employment with respect to the replacement rate for Austria ranging from 1.4 to above 2.
There is little evidence on replacement rate effects for Germany. One exception is Hunt (1995), who finds
that a cut of the replacement rate in the 1980s for individuals without children increased the exit rate from
unemployment into retirement. Early studies estimated the employment effects of the level and duration
of unemployment insurance benefits without appeal to exogenous policy changes, discontinuities, or other
quasi-natural sources of variation. Using US data, Katz and Meyer (1990) find that a one-week extension
of the initial entitlement period increased the time until re-employment by 0.16–0.20 weeks. Concerning the
same quantity, Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) report a figure of 0.1 weeks for the US, and Ham and Rea (1987)
find effects in the range of 0.26–0.33 weeks for Canada. Katz and Meyer (1990) report that a 10 percentage
point increase in the replacement rate increases the duration until re-employment by 1.2–1.5 weeks.
30
Age at start of non-employment spell (years)
20 30 40
I: Effect of three month (quarter of a year) increase in the initial entitlement period on average quarters
until re-employment:
Women 0.076 0.102 0.100
Men 0.136 0.146 0.136
II: Effect of a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate on average weeks until re-employment:
Women 0.939 0.773 0.792
Men 0.769 0.566 0.676
Note: Results are based on 92,232 simulated non-employment spells. Spells are right-censored at 30
months. Only eligible individuals are included. To ensure comparability with the literature, which
generally reports effects for the gross replacement rate, our net replacement rate effects have been scaled
by (1− τ0)−1, where τ0 is the average tax rate of 0.418.
Table 8: Effect of unemployment insurance on the time until re-employment
outcomes are simulated under a baseline regime and under two counterfactuals. In the base-
line regime, the unemployment insurance system is unchanged: the initial entitlement period
is 12 months for individuals entering non-employment before age 45, and the replacement
rate is 60% for individuals without children (or 67% for those with children). In the first
counterfactual, there is an unanticipated increase of 3 months in the initial entitlement pe-
riod. In the second counterfactual, there is an unanticipated increase in the replacement
rate of 10 percentage points, occurring at the start of the non-employment spell. Panel I in
Table 8 summarizes the implications of the estimated life-cycle model with respect to the
initial entitlement period. The model predicts that a three month (i.e., quarter of a year)
increase in the initial entitlement period increases the average time until re-employment by
around 0.1 quarters for women and 0.15 quarters for men. Panel II in Table 8 shows that
the model predicts that a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate increase the
average time until re-employment by 0.57–0.94 weeks, with effects being slightly larger for
women than for men. In summary, predictions from the estimated life-cycle model about
how employment depends on the duration and generosity of unemployment insurance match
the findings of previous reduced-form studies.
As a further plausibility check, we show that predictions from the estimated life-cycle
model about the effect of unemployment insurance on the timing of exits from non-employment
are in line with previously documented patterns. Consistent with the empirical results of
Lalive et al. (2006), Figure 2(a) shows the model predicts that the effect of an increase in
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(a) Initial entitlement period extended from 12 to 15
months
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(b) Replacement rate increased by 10 percentage
points
Note: Estimates from a pooled inflow sample of unemployment insurance-eligible individuals entering non-
employment at ages 20, 30, and 40 years. Given the quarterly decision-making frequency in the model, exits
from non-employment are possible only at three month intervals.
Figure 2: Effect of unemployment insurance on the non-employment survivor function
the initial entitlement period is concentrated around the time of benefit exhaustion, i.e., at
12 months of non-employment. In contrast, and again consistent with Lalive et al. (2006),
Figure 2(b) shows the model predicts that the employment effect of an increase in the
replacement rate occurs mainly during the period of unemployment insurance covered non-
employment, i.e., during the first 12 months of non-employment.
6.3.2 The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Consumption Smoothing
Next, we compare the consumption smoothing effect of unemployment insurance predicted
by the estimated life-cycle model to findings in the literature. Based on a pooled inflow
sample of individuals entering non-employment due to exogenous job loss at age 20, 30, and
40 years, we use the estimated life-cycle model to simulate consumption trajectories under
unemployment insurance replacement rates between 0% and 70%. Figure 3 summarizes the
simulated consumption trajectories by showing the average change in log real consumption
between the period before non-employment and the first period of non-employment according
to the unemployment insurance replacement rate. Consumption declines by 15% when the
unemployment insurance replacement rate is equal to 70% while without unemployment
insurance consumption falls by 32%. Averaging over replacement rates between 0% and
70%, the estimated life-cycle model predicts that a 10 percentage point increase in the
unemployment insurance replacement rate reduces the consumption fall associated with job
loss by 2.3 percentage points. The consumption smoothing effect of unemployment insurance
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predicted by the estimated life-cycle model aligns with the results of Gruber (1997), Kroft
and Notowidigdo (2016), and Ganong and Noel (2019) who report comparable consumption
smoothing effects from US data of 2.6, 2.8, and 2.7 percentage points, respectively.
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Note: As in Gruber (1997), the dependent variable is the average change in log real consumption between
one period before entering non-employment and the first period of non-employment.
Figure 3: The effect of unemployment insurance on the consumption fall when entering
non-employment
6.3.3 The Added Worker Effect
The added worker effect refers to a labor supply pattern in married households where the wife
increases her labor supply when her husband looses his job. Halla et al. (2018) estimate the
added worker effect using administrative data on plant closures in Austria. They find that,
for women who were non-employed at the time of their husband’s job loss, the employment
rate during the five years following the husband’s job loss increased by between 1.5 and 1.9
percentage points. We calculate an analogous added worker effect based on the estimated life-
cycle model.34 Figure 4 shows the estimated life-cycle model predicts that the employment
rate of wives increases by around one percentage point during five years following their
husband’s job loss. The similarity between the added worker effect predicted by the estimated
34Our life-cycle model provides a micro-foundation for the added worker effect. The added worker effect
predicted by the model depends on leisure complementaries, which we estimate, the taxation of married
individuals based on household income (i.e., joint taxation), which we base on the prevailing tax rules, the
strength of risk aversion, which we estimate, and our assumption about income pooling in married households.
In Section 7.4 we show that income pooling in married households is the most important mechanism behind
the effect of married households on the optimal generosity of social assistance.
33
life-cycle model and the estimates of Halla et al. (2018) suggests that the life-cycle model
provides a satisfactory micro-foundation for the added worker effect.
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Note: We consider in turn the age points 20, 30, and 40 years and use the estimated life-cycle model to
simulate optimal household behavior, first, when the husband is not subject to a job destruction at the age
point of interest and, second, when the husband is subject to an unanticipated job destruction at the age
point of interest. The figure shows the average effect of the husband’s job destruction on the employment
rate of wives who were non-employed at the time of their husband’s job destruction. We consider optimal
household behavior in each scenario and, therefore, the husband may return to employment. Results are for
households that remained married between 3 months before and 5 years after the husband’s job destruction.
Figure 4: Wives’ employment response to husband’s job loss
7 Counterfactual Policy Reforms
We use the estimated life-cycle model to explore the optimal design of the social safety net.
Before proceeding to our policy results, we describe how we measure and decompose the
welfare effects of policy reforms.
7.1 Welfare Metric and Welfare Decomposition
We summarize the welfare implications of policy changes by using an equivalent variation
based welfare metric. Specifically, we designate the year 2000 policy environment described in
Section 2.3 as the baseline. We then define the welfare value of an alternative environment
as the proportional adjustment in consumption in the baseline environment that makes
34
individuals ex ante indifferent between the two environments.35
Formally, let A denote the alternative environment and let B denote the baseline envi-
ronment. The welfare value of environment A is denoted by γA and solves VB(γA) = VA(0),
where:
Ve(γ) = E
Υ TF∑
τ=ti
δτ−tiUF (mei,j,τ (1 + γ), d
e
i,τ , d
e
j,τ , s
e
i,τ ) +
+(1−Υ)
TM∑
τ=tj
δτ−tjUM(mei,j,τ (1 + γ), d
e
i,τ , d
e
j,τ , s
e
j,τ )
 for e ∈ {A,B}. (24)
In the above, ti and tj denote the time of woman i’s and man j’s entry into the labor
force, e superscripts denote variable realizations in environment e, Υ = 0.5 denotes the
social planner’s weight on women, and the expectation is with respect to education and
with respect to all shocks, including wage shocks and job destructions. The consumption
adjustment, γ, is implemented at ex post and, therefore, does not affect behavior.
We use a decomposition to understand the mechanisms behind the welfare effects of policy
changes. Our approach follows Floden (2001), Benabou (2002), Koehne and Kuhn (2015),
and Michelacci and Ruffo (2015). In particular, we decompose γA into five components:
γA = γA,CL︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption
level effect
+ γA,CI︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption
inequality effect
+ γA,CU︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption
uncertainty effect
+ γA,E︸︷︷︸
employment
effect
+ γA,S︸︷︷︸
search cost
effect
. (25)
The consumption level effect, γA,CL, is the welfare value of the change in the level of con-
sumption in the economy. The consumption inequality effect, γA,CI , is the welfare value
of the change in the inequality of lifetime consumption across individuals. This captures
how the policy change redistributes consumption between individuals with different levels
of lifetime consumption. The consumption uncertainty effect, γA,CU , is the welfare value of
changes over time in variability of consumption at the individual level. This captures the
consumption smoothing effect of the policy change. The employment effect, γA,E, is the
welfare effect of changes that individuals make in their employment behavior in the response
to the policy change. The search cost effect, γA,S, is the welfare effect of changes in job
search costs. Appendix D formally defines each welfare component.36
35We omit any social assistance claiming costs from this calculation.
36This decomposition highlights that our problem combines an insurance problem with moral hazard,
where agents are ex ante identical but face risk, and a redistribution problem with adverse selection, where
agents have heterogeneous endowments but outcomes are certain conditional on behavior. Problems of this
kind have been studied empirically, e.g., Blundell and Shephard (2011) and Chan (2013), but have seldom
35
Unless stated otherwise, the counterfactual policy analysis uses the rules for unemploy-
ment insurance and social assistance described in Section 2.3.37 Throughout the counterfac-
tual analysis, individuals are eligible for pensions, child benefits, and parental leave benefits
as described in Section 2.3. To allow a transparent analysis of the interplay between the
design of the social safety net and the nature of taxation, we replace the detailed model
of the tax system that we have used so far with an accurate two-parameter approximating
function.38 Specifically, we approximate the tax paid by a single-adult household as follows:
Tax = τ0 × y¯ ×
(
Earnings+Interest Income
y¯
)τ1
. (26)
The parameter τ0 controls the scale of the tax system. Specifically, τ0 is equal to the average
tax rate for individuals with earnings plus interest income equal to y¯. We set y¯ equal to the
average annual earnings of the individuals in our sample (30,608 euros) and then interpret τ0
as the average tax rate. The parameter τ1 controls the progressivity of the tax system: tax is
progressive if τ1 > 1; tax is flat rate if τ1 = 1; and tax is regressive if τ1 < 1. We continue to
assume that married individuals are taxed based on household income, i.e., joint taxation.39
We use non-linear least squares to estimate τˆ0 = 0.419 and τˆ1 = 1.217 based on the year
2000 tax rules. The R-squared for the approximation is equal to 0.9992. Figure A.3 in Web
Appendix D shows the fitted two-parameter tax function provides a good approximation to
the detailed tax rules.
7.2 Optimal Social Assistance and Unemployment Insurance
We gain some initial insights on the different functions of unemployment insurance and social
assistance by contrasting a 5% cut in the social assistance income floor with a revenue-
equivalent cut in the unemployment insurance replacement rate. Specifically, the cut in
the unemployment insurance replacement rate is calibrated to generate the same increase
in net government revenue as the 5% cut in the social assistance income floor (where net
government revenue is equal to the present value of revenue from taxes minus the cost of
unemployment insurance, social assistance, pension benefits, child benefits, and parental
been studied theoretically. See Boadway and Sato (2014) for a theoretical treatment of optimal income
taxation when earnings can differ because of ability and luck.
37For simplicity we assume a common replacement rate for unemployment insurance, irrespective of the
presence of children in the household, and we omit unemployment assistance (which was abolished in 2005).
38The detailed tax model contains an infeasibly large number of parameter for an optimality exercise.
39Under joint taxation, the tax on a married household is equal to twice the tax for a single-adult household
with earnings equal to the average earnings of the husband and wife plus half of the married household’s
interest income.
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leave benefits). Households are taxed based on the year 2000 rules, therefore this exercise
compares the effects of unemployment insurance and social assistance in the presence of the
progressive schedule of income taxation households actually faced.
Column (1)–(3) of Table 9 summarize our results. Column (1) shows average household
wealth and the employment rate in the baseline policy environment, where the social assis-
tance income floor is equal to the year 2000 level and the unemployment insurance replace-
ment rate is equal to 60%. Columns (2) and (3) show the effects of revenue-equivalent cuts
in social assistance and unemployment insurance, respectively. Panel I shows a 5% cut in the
social assistance income floor increases average net government revenue by 1.2%; a 6 percent-
age point cut in the unemployment insurance replacement rate–from 60% to 54%–generates
the same increase in net government revenue. Panel II shows that the revenue-equivalent
cuts in social assistance and unemployment insurance both increase the employment rate by
around 0.25 percentage points. The 5% cut in the generosity of social assistance increases
average household wealth by 1.2% compared to the baseline while the revenue-equivalent
cut in unemployment insurance has no appreciable effect on average household wealth. The
cut in social assistance, therefore, elicits more substitution from public to intra-household
insurance than the cut in unemployment insurance.
Columns (2) and (3) in Panel III of Table 9 show the welfare effects of revenue-equivalent
cuts in social assistance and unemployment insurance, respectively. We find that the cut in
social assistance leads to a larger welfare loss than the revenue-equivalent cut in unemploy-
ment insurance (-0.53% versus -0.27% of baseline consumption). The welfare decomposition
shows that the difference between the welfare effects of the cuts in social assistance and
unemployment insurance is primarily explained by the different insurance effects of the two
programs. Specifically, the cut in social assistance decreases the consumption uncertainty
component of the welfare gain by 0.33% of baseline consumption while the revenue-equivalent
cut in unemployment insurance has a negligible effect on consumption uncertainty. The dif-
ferent insurance effects of social assistance and unemployment insurance reflect the leading
difference between the two programs: social assistance targets the poorest households by
providing a means-tested minimum income to wealth-poor households while unemployment
insurance is paid to individuals who have recently left employment, irrespective of wealth or
other household income. The other welfare components are less important. In particular,
the consumption inequality effects are small, suggesting that the cuts in social assistance
and unemployment insurance have modest redistributive effects.
We now turn to the optimal mix of unemployment insurance and social assistance. Specif-
ically, we consider all combinations of the unemployment insurance replacement rate and
the social assistance income floor that are revenue equivalent to the baseline policy envi-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
I: Policy environment (* denotes a parameter that has been optimized to maximize welfare)
Unemployment insurance replacement rate (%) 60 60 54 9∗ 0∗
Social assistance income floor (% of baseline) 100 95 100 133∗ 105∗
Average tax rate (τ0) 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.39
∗
Change in net government revenue (% of baseline) – 1.23 1.23 0.00 0.00
II: Behaviors
Wealth (euros per household) 94,853 95,944 94,628 87,109 100,864
Employment rate 0.647 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.671
III: Welfare effects
Welfare gain (% of baseline consumption) – -0.53 -0.27 1.32 2.20
Welfare decomposition:
Consumption level effect – 0.11 -0.11 -1.06 3.63
Consumption inequality effect – -0.04 0.01 0.23 -0.20
Consumption uncertainty effect – -0.33 0.01 1.57 -0.24
Employment effect – -0.16 -0.25 -0.56 -1.44
Search cost effect – -0.11 0.07 1.14 0.44
Note: Column (1) summarizes the baseline policy environment. Column (2) summarizes outcomes when
the social assistance income floor is cut by 5% from the baseline level. Column (3) summarizes outcomes
when the unemployment insurance replacement rate is cut to generate the same change in net revenue
government as the 5% cut in social assistance. Column (4) shows outcomes when the unemployment
insurance replacement rate and social assistance income floor are jointly chosen to maximize welfare
subject to generating the same net government revenue as in the baseline policy environment. Column (5)
shows outcomes when the unemployment insurance replacement rate, social assistance income floor, and
the average tax rate (τ0) are jointly chosen to maximize welfare again subject to generating the same net
government revenue as in the baseline policy environment. In (1)–(5) households face the year 2000 rules
for pension benefits, child benefits, and parental leave benefits. In (1)–(4) households face the year 2000
tax system while in (5) they face a tax system with the year 2000 progressivity and the average tax rate
resulting from the welfare optimization problem. Net government revenue is equal to the present value of
revenue from taxes minus the cost of unemployment insurance, social assistance, pension benefits, child
benefits, and parental leave benefits. Wealth is average household wealth for single households where
the household head aged 18–65 years and married households where the wife is aged 18–65 years. The
employment rate is for all individuals aged 18–65 years. The welfare gain and the components of the
welfare decomposition are calculated using the method described in Section 7.1.
Table 9: Optimal mix & optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance
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ronment and identify the combination that maximizes welfare. Individuals continue to face
the progressive year 2000 tax system. Column (4) of Table 9 shows that the optimal mix is
characterized by an unemployment insurance replacement rate of 9% and a social assistance
income floor that is equal to 133% of the baseline level. That is, the optimal mix of unem-
ployment insurance and social assistance focuses on permanent universal social assistance,
with a minor role for temporary earnings-related unemployment insurance. The optimal mix
of unemployment insurance and social assistance is fundamentally different from the current
German system, in which both time-limited earnings-related unemployment insurance and
long-term universal social assistance are important. Instead, our optimal policy rule shares
many features with assistance-orientated social support systems, such as the benefit system
in the United Kingdom.
Our finding that social assistance dominates the optimal mix is consistent with our earlier
results showing that a cut in social assistance leads to a larger welfare loss than a revenue-
equivalent cut in unemployment insurance. Column (4) of Table 9 shows moving from
the baseline policy environment to the optimal mix of unemployment insurance and social
assistance increases welfare by 1.32% of baseline consumption. The welfare gains comprise
negative consumption level and employment effects and positive consumption uncertainty,
consumption inequality, and search costs effects. The negative consumption level effect is
driven by the decrease in interest income due to lower wealth accumulation and the negative
employment effect reflects the increase in the employment rate. The welfare gains from the
reduction in consumption uncertainty are due to the consumption smoothing effect of social
assistance while the gains from lower search costs reflect a combination of an increase in the
employment rate and a decrease in search intensity among the non-employed. The welfare
gains from a reduction in the inequality of consumption show that social assistance is more
effective at redistributing lifetime income than unemployment insurance.
Next, we explore whether our conclusions about the optimal mix of unemployment in-
surance and social assistance continue of hold when we introduce the average tax rate as
an additional policy instrument. Note, while the unemployment insurance replacement rate
and social assistance income floor together determine the mix of unemployment insurance
and social assistance, the average tax rate sets the overall generosity of the social safety net.
Column (5) of Table 9 shows the combination of the unemployment insurance replacement
rate, social assistance income floor, and average tax rate that maximizes welfare subject to
generating the same net government revenue as in the baseline. Compared to column (4),
where the average tax rate was fixed at the baseline rate, the optimal generosity of social
assistance falls from 133% to 105% of the baseline generosity while the optimal unemploy-
ment insurance replacement rate falls from 9% to 0%. Commensurate with the lower overall
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generosity of the social safety net, the average tax rate falls from 42% to 39%: at the baseline
average tax rate the efficiency benefit from cutting taxes exceeds the utility loss from less
generous unemployment insurance and social assistance. In summary, adding the average
tax rate as a policy instrument reduces the optimal generosity of the social safety net but
social assistance continues to dominate unemployment insurance in the optimal mix.
The move to the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and
social assistance increases welfare by 2.2% of baseline consumption compared to the baseline
policy environment and by 0.9% of baseline consumption compared to when the optimal mix
is derived holding the average tax rate fixed at the baseline rate. Therefore, lowering the
average tax rate in conjunction with cutting the generosity of unemployment insurance and
social assistance generates appreciable additional welfare gains. The welfare decomposition
shows that the composition of the welfare gains changes when the average tax rate is added
as a policy instrument. Specifically, the consumption level effect becomes the dominating
welfare component, increasing welfare by 3.6%, while the lower generosity of social assistance
has negative implications for the inequality and uncertainty of consumption. The higher
average level of consumption is the result of increases in employment and wealth. The
increase in employment also drives the larger employment effect in the welfare decomposition.
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Note: Consumption uncertainty and consumption inequality are taken directly from the welfare decomposi-
tion in Section 7.1. Moral hazard is defined as the sum of the consumption level, employment, and search
cost effects in the welfare decomposition. In (a) social assistance is set to the optimal generosity of 105%
of the baseline level and in (b) the unemployment insurance replacement rate is set to the optimal value of
0%. In all cases, tax progressivity is as in the baseline and the average tax rate is adjusted to generate the
same net government revenue as in the baseline.
Figure 5: Moral hazard, consumption uncertainty, and consumption inequality effects of
unemployment insurance and social assistance
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Our results on the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and
social assistance arises from a three-way trade-off between moral hazard, consumption un-
certainty (insurance), and consumption inequality (redistribution). We explore how this
trade-off drives our finding of a zero optimal replacement rate for unemployment insurance.
Figure 5(a) shows the welfare effects of moral hazard (defined as the sum of the consump-
tion level, employment, and search cost effects), consumption uncertainty, and consumption
inequality against the unemployment insurance replacement rate. At each value of the un-
employment insurance replacement rate, social assistance is set to the optimal generosity
of 105% of the baseline level and the average tax rate is adjusted to generate the same net
government revenue as in the baseline policy environment. As the unemployment insurance
replacement is cut, there are modest welfare losses from increases in consumption uncertainty
and consumption inequality. However, the zero optimal unemployment insurance replace-
ment rate arises because these losses are more than offset by the increase in welfare due to
the reduction in moral hazard.
The modest increase in consumption uncertainty as unemployment insurance is cut re-
flects two factors. First, individuals optimally respond to cuts in unemployment insurance
by increasing their labor supply, which reduces the expected duration of the lower consump-
tion that accompanies job loss.40 Second, interactions between unemployment insurance and
social assistance limit the consumption losses from cuts in unemployment insurance for indi-
viduals with limited means to smooth their own consumption. Specifically, social assistance
with a generosity of 105% of the baseline level guarantees a moderately generous minimum
income to wealth-poor households and, therefore, provides individuals in low-income wealth-
poor households with an alternative source of insurance in the face of cuts in unemployment
insurance. We explore the interaction between unemployment insurance and social assis-
tance further by calculating the consumption smoothing effect and optimal generosity of
unemployment insurance in the presence of less generous social assistance. We find that
unemployment insurance is a valuable consumption smoothing device when social assistance
fixed at 5% or 10% of the baseline generosity. Consequently, the optimal unemployment
insurance replacement rate is 20% when the social assistance income floor is equal to 5% of
the baseline generosity or 10% when the social assistance income floor is equal to 10% of
the baseline generosity.41 These optimal replacement rates are comparable to the findings
of Gruber (1997) who derives the optimal unemployment insurance replacement rate in the
absence of social assistance.
40This effect reconciles the consumption fall associated with job loss reported in Section 6.3.2 with the
modest changes in the welfare effect of consumption uncertainty shown in Figure 5(a).
41See Figure A.4 in Web Appendix D for further details.
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We also explore the trade-off behind our finding that the optimal generosity of social
assistance is 105% of the baseline level. Figure 5(b) shows the welfare effects of moral
hazard, consumption uncertainty, and consumption inequality against the generosity of social
assistance. At each value of social assistance, the unemployment insurance replacement rate
is set to the optimal value of 0% and the average tax rate is adjusted to generate the same
net government revenue as in the baseline policy environment. The welfare effects of social
assistance operate almost entirely through moral hazard and consumption uncertainty, with
little effect coming through changes in the inequality of consumption. Starting at the baseline
generosity of social assistance, increasing the generosity of social assistance increases welfare
by reducing consumption uncertainty and this effect is slightly larger than the reduction in
welfare from the increase in moral hazard. However, starting at social assistance generosities
of 105% of the baseline level, the moral hazard costs from increases in generosity of social
assistance start to outweigh the welfare gains from the reduction in consumption uncertainty.
Figure 5(b) also shows that at social assistance generosities below 100% of the baseline level
consumption uncertainty increases rapidly as the generosity as social assistance decreases.
This highlights an important role for social assistance in protecting households against spells
of low consumption.
We compare the 2.2% welfare gain from the optimal mix and optimal generosity of
unemployment insurance and social assistance with the gains from other revenue-equivalent
combinations of social assistance, unemployment insurance, and the average tax rate. This
comparison establishes that welfare is sufficiently sensitive to the parameters of the policy
environment to make the precise design of the social safety net economically important. In
more detail, Figure 6 shows, conditional on the optimal social assistance income floor of 105%,
welfare increases as the unemployment insurance replacement rate is decreased, however, the
welfare gain from cutting unemployment is decreasing in the replacement rate, e.g., cutting
the unemployment insurance replacement rate from 70% to 60% increases welfare by about
0.7% of baseline consumption while a cut from 10% to 0% increases welfare by 0.13% of
baseline consumption. We also find, conditional on the optimal unemployment insurance
replacement rate of 0%, there are modest welfare losses from local changes in the generosity
of social assistance away from the optimal generosity of 105%, e.g., a 10 percentage point
increase or decrease in the generosity of social assistance from its optimal generosity decreases
welfare by around 0.1% of baseline consumption. However, larger changes in social assistance
away from its optimal level have important welfare implications, e.g., continuing to hold the
unemployment insurance replacement rate at 0%, cuts in the generosity of social assistance
to 75%, 50%, and 25% of its baseline generosity give welfare losses of 0.6%, 2%, and 6.1%
of baseline consumption compared to the optimal generosity of social assistance.
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Note: UI RR denotes the unemployment insurance replacement rate. In the baseline, the social assistance
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and the average tax rate is 41.9%. In each alternative environment, the average tax rate is set to make the
policy environment revenue equivalent to the baseline.
Figure 6: Welfare effects of unemployment insurance and social assistance
7.3 Robustness
In Section 7.2 we restricted the optimal policy analysis to three parameters: the unemploy-
ment insurance replacement rate; the social assistance income floor; and the average tax rate.
Table 10 shows that our results on the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment
insurance and social assistance are robust to changes in other policy parameters. First, we
explore the consequences of more generous means-testing for social assistance. Neither the
introduction of an income exemption for the means test of 2,000 euros per year (column 1)
nor a reduction in the taper rate from 100% to 50% (column 2) substantially changes our
results. Next, we explore whether a role for unemployment insurance emerges as the enti-
tlement is shortened; this is possible because shortening the entitlement period reduces the
distortionary effects of unemployment insurance on search effort while still protecting indi-
viduals against the immediate effects of job loss. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 10 show that
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the optimal unemployment insurance replacement rate remains at zero when the duration
of benefits is capped at 12 or 6 months.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unemployment insurance replacement rate (%) 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0
Social assistance income floor (% of baseline) 102 106 105 105 105 105 105 115 80
Average tax rate (τ0) 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.39
Tax progressivity (τ1) 1.65
Welfare gain (% of baseline consumption) 2.62 2.96 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 3.17 3.12
Change in policy environment:
SA income exemption (euros per year) 2,000
SA taper rate 50%
Maximum UI duration (months) 12 6 6 6 6
UI wealth test (euros) Yes Yes Yes
UI spousal earnings test Yes Yes
UI eligible earnings cap (euros per year) 30,000
Individual taxation Yes
Optimize tax progressivity (τ1 = 1.22 in baseline) Yes
Note: For each alternative policy environment, the unemployment insurance replacement rate, social
assistance income floor, and average tax rate (τ0) are jointly chosen to maximize welfare subject to
generating the same net government revenue as in the baseline policy environment. In column (10), tax
progressivity (τ1) is also optimized. The baseline policy parameters are as follows: social assistance
(SA) income exemption of zero; SA taper rate of 100% (i.e., social assistance is withdrawn one-of-
one against the household’s income from other sources); maximum unemployment insurance (UI)
duration of 12–30 months (depending on age); no UI wealth test; no UI spousal earnings test; and
an UI eligible earning cap of 51,765 euros per year. Under the UI wealth test only single individuals
with wealth below 4,090 euros and individual in married households with wealth below 8,181 euros are
eligible for unemployment insurance. Under the UI spousal earnings test a married individual’s income
from unemployment insurance is reduced one-for-one against their spouse’s earnings. Column (5) in
Table 9 shows the optimal unemployment insurance replacement rate, social assistance income floor,
and average tax rate when all other policy parameters take their baseline values.
Table 10: Robustness to ancillary parameters of the policy environment
In a further round of robustness checks we modify unemployment insurance by adding
rules that typically appear in assistance benefits and then recalculate the optimal mix and
optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance. The modifications we
consider restrict unemployment insurance to relatively less advantaged individuals thereby
moving the insurance-incentive-redistribution trade-off in favor of more generous unemploy-
ment insurance. The results of this exercise are summarized in columns (5)–(7) of Table 10.
The optimal unemployment insurance replacement rate remains at zero when we make un-
employment insurance subject to the social assistance wealth test. A small amount of un-
employment insurance is optimal when we also add a spousal earnings test that reduces
a married individual’s unemployment insurance one-for-one against their spouse’s post-tax
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment insurance replacement rate (%) 0 0 0 0
Social assistance income floor (% of baseline) 116 92 99 108
Average tax rate (τ0) 0.44 0.39 0.38 0.40
Change in model specification compared to the estimated model:
Suppress saving Yes
Increase in risk aversion by 10% Yes
Suppress wage shocks Yes
Introduce correlation of 0.7 between spouses’ employment shocks Yes
Note: For each model specification, the unemployment insurance replacement rate, social assistance
income floor, and average tax rate (τ0) are jointly chosen to maximize welfare subject to generating
the same net government revenue as in the estimated life-cycle model with the baseline policy
environment. Column (5) in Table 9 shows the optimal unemployment insurance replacement
rate, social assistance income floor, and average tax rate based on the estimated life-cycle model.
Table 11: Robustness to the model specification
earnings; however, the welfare gain from the spousal earnings test is negligible. When we
additionally lower the cap on earnings that are eligible for unemployment insurance from
51,567 euros per year to 30,000 euros per year the optimal unemployment insurance replace-
ment rate falls back to zero. The final two columns of Table 10 show that social assistance
continues to dominate the optimal policy mix when: i) the tax base is changed from the
household to the individual; and ii) the progressivity of the tax schedule is adjusted along
with the unemployment insurance replacement rate, the social assistance income floor, and
the average tax rate to maximize welfare.
We also explore the robustness of our results on the optimal mix and optimal generosity
of unemployment insurance and social assistance to several assumptions in the estimated
life-cycle model. Table 11 shows how the optimal policy changes when we move away from
the estimated life-cycle model by suppressing saving, increasing risk aversion, suppressing
wage shocks, or introducing a correlation between spouses’ employment shocks. For each
alternative model specification, we continue to find that there is no role for unemployment
insurance in the optimally designed social safety net and that the optimal generosity of social
assistance is similar to the generosity suggested by the estimated life-cycle model (the aver-
age tax rate varies across specifications because this parameter is chosen to ensure revenue
equivalence to the baseline policy environment in the estimated life-cycle model).42 Web
Appendix E shows that the optimal policy continues to be dominated by social assistance
42Figure A.5 in Web Appendix D shows the moral hazard, consumption uncertainty, and consumption
inequality effects of unemployment insurance when households cannot save. The welfare effects of unem-
ployment insurance with and without saving are qualitatively similar, although suppressing saving decreases
the moral hazard effects and increases the consumption uncertainty effects.
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when we include equilibrium effects.
7.4 Optimal Policy and the Family
Finally we explore how the presence of married households in the population affects the
design of the optimal social safety net. For this purpose, we consider the optimal mix
and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance under two models:
a family model and a single model. The family model is the estimated life-cycle model
that we used for the policy analysis in Section 7.2. Note, the family model includes the
empirical mix of single and married households. The single model is obtained by setting the
marriage probabilities in the family model to zero, thereby generating a model of the life-
cycle behavior of single households. Panel I of Table 12 shows that the marital composition
of the population strongly affects the optimal generosity of social assistance. In a society
of only single households the optimal generosity of social assistance is 166% of the baseline
generosity. The presence of married households in the population therefore reduces the
optimal generosity of social assistance from 166% to 105% of the baseline generosity. In
contrast, unemployment insurance is optimally absent from the optimal policy, irrespective
of the marital composition of the population.43 Welfare calculations show that the difference
between the optimal policies derived from the single and family models is economically
important: imposing the optimal policy from the single model on a population with the
empirical mix of single and married households leads to a welfare loss of 0.96% of baseline
consumption compared to the optimal policy from the family model, which increases welfare
by 2.2% of baseline consumption (see column 5 in Table 9).
There are four mechanisms through which marital status can affect the optimal design
of the safety net. First, the taxation of married individuals based on household income, i.e.,
joint taxation, gives a tax benefit to married individuals with a non-working spouse compared
to if they were single. Second, husband-provided childcare allows a working married woman
to receive free childcare from her husband if he is not working while a working single woman
must purchase childcare. Third, marital status may affect the parameters of preferences
and technology. Fourth, income pooling in married households provides intra-household
insurance. The intra-household insurance from income pooling arises from two effects: the
endogenous labor supply response to a spousal income shock, which may partly compensate
the reduction in household income, i.e., the added worker effect, and the income effect from
spousal earnings that applies irrespective of the added worker effect.44
43Reflecting this result, Figure A.6 in Web Appendix D shows that consumption uncertainty changes with
the unemployment insurance replacement rate similarly in the single and family models.
44Spousal income in married households has important implications for social assistance. We use a
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Optimal policy Fraction of family
parameters SA effect explained
UI SA by change
I: Comparison of the family model and the single model
Family model 0 105
Single model 0 166
Family effect (effect of married households on optimal policy) 0 -61
II: Decomposition of the family effect
Successive change to the family model:
Married individuals taxed on individual income 0 115 0.17
Remove husband provided childcare 0 115 0.00
Married individuals have singles’ parameters 10 136 0.35
Remove income pooling in married households 0 166 0.48
Note: The family model is the estimated life-cycle model that we used for the policy analysis in
Section 7.2. The single model is obtained by setting the marriage probabilities in the family model to
zero. For each model, the unemployment insurance replacement rate, social assistance income floor,
and average tax rate (τ0) are jointly chosen to maximize welfare subject to generating the same net
government revenue as in the estimated life-cycle model with the baseline policy environment. The
column headed UI show the optimal unemployment insurance replacement rate. The column headed
SA denotes the optimal generosity of social assistance as a percentage of the baseline generosity.
Table 12: Effect of married households on the optimal mix and optimal generosity of
unemployment insurance and social assistance
Panel II of Table 12 shows that income pooling is the most important mechanism, ex-
plaining almost 50% of the effect of married households on the optimal generosity of social
assistance. This large effect of income pooling is consistent with the importance of intra-
household insurance through family labor supply documented in Blundell et al. (2016b). The
taxation of married individuals based on household income, i.e., joint taxation, explains 17%
of the effect of married households on the optimal generosity of social assistance. Intuitively,
switching from joint to individual taxation removes a tax benefit from working married indi-
viduals with a non-working spouse, leading to a reduction in disposable income and demand
for more generous social assistance. Reflecting the high employment rate of married men,
husband-provided childcare is unimportant to the optimal generosity of social assistance.
Parameter differences between single and married individuals explain 35% of the effect of
married households on the optimal generosity of social assistance.
regression-based decomposition based on data simulated from the estimated life-cycle model to understand
how spousal income affects social assistance receipt. Focusing on non-working married individuals, we find
that having a working spouse reduces the rate of social assistance receipt for married individuals from 7.0%
to 0.1%. If the same individuals were single then 20.4% would receive social assistance.
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8 Conclusion
There are large international differences in how social insurance and social assistance pro-
grams are combined to support households facing job loss and other adverse circumstances.
The US, Germany, and France, for example, combine temporary earnings-related benefits
with permanent or long-term social assistance that is not based on previous earnings. In
contrast, social support in the UK is provided primarily through universal social assistance.
In this paper, we have explored how best to combine unemployment insurance and social
assistance, given intra-household insurance from savings and family labor supply.
Our main finding is that assistance-orientated social support systems dominate insurance-
based programs of support. In the most preferred social insurance and assistance system,
permanent universal social assistance guarantees a moderately generous income to wealth-
poor households, and there is little or no role for temporary earnings-related unemployment
insurance. The optimal system resembles the UK’s assistance-orientated framework for so-
cial support, and differs fundamentally from the existing programs of social support in the
US, Germany, and France. The limited rule for unemployment insurance in the optimal
social safety net arises because social assistance provides an income guarantee to wealth-
poor households that limits the insurance value of unemployment insurance. We also show
that marital status matters for the design of the optimal social safety net. Mainly due to
income pooling in married households, the presence of married households in the population
decreases the optimal generosity of social assistance.
Our analysis provides some more general insights that are relevant to future research.
Our finding of complementarity between the leisure times of the husband and wife suggests
that understanding the policy relevance of intra-household insurance requires recognition of
the preference-based drivers of couples’ behavior. Meanwhile, our results showing that social
assistance reduces the insurance value of unemployment insurance highlight the importance
of accounting for program interdependencies when evaluating and designing programs that
support low-income populations.
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Appendix
A Additional Programs
Child-care Costs
We assume that a married household with one or more pre-school aged children must pay
for full-time childcare if both spouses work full-time. A married household incurs part-
time childcare costs if the wife works part-time and the husband works full-time. A single
woman with one or more pre-school aged children must pay childcare costs reflecting her
hours of work. Based on Wrohlich (2011), we estimate monthly childcare costs for a child
younger than 3 years of 183 euros for part-time care and 397 euros for full-time care. The
corresponding figures for a child aged between 3 and 6 years are 90 euros and 167 euros.
Child Benefits and Parental Leave Benefits
A household receives child benefits of 138 euros per month for each dependent child. A
household also receives parental leave benefits of 306 euros per month if the youngest child
in the household is aged under 24 months and the mother is not employed. Parental leave
benefits are restricted to households whose net annual income, excluding social assistance,
is below a threshold that depends on marital status and the number of children in the
household. Additionally, if the youngest child is older than 6 months then the monthly
parental leave benefit is withdrawn at a rate of 3.3% against the household’s net annual
income, excluding social assistance, above an allowance.45
Pensions
A retired individual’s annual pension is proportional to his or her lifetime earnings:
Pensiong,t = Ξ× Expg,t ×Wg(HiEducg, 0.5× Expg,t, κ) for g ∈ {i, j}. (27)
In the above, Wg() denotes the gender-specific market wage function (20) evaluated at the
individual’s education, average experience over the life-cycle, and the population average of
45The net annual income thresholds for the first means test are as follows: 51,129 euros for a married
household with one child; 53,277 euros for a married household with two children; 38,347 euros for a single
household with one child; and 40,494 euros for a single household with two children. The annual allowances
for the second means test are equal to: 15,032 euros for a married household with one child; 17,179 euros
for a married household with two children; 12,118 euros for a single household with one child; and 14,265
for the single household with two children.
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the wage unobservable, κ (see footnote 23). Reflecting the pension system that was effective
during the sample period, we set Ξ to 20.
B Marriage, Divorce, Fertility, & Assortative Mating
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Figure 7: Quarterly marriage, divorce, and birth probabilities
Women Men
Low education High education Low education High education
0.118 0.627 0.069 0.412
Table 13: Probability that an individual’s spouse has high education
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C Internal Goodness of Fit
I: Voluntary quit rate
Single women Married women Single men Married men
Obs. Fitted Obs. Fitted Obs. Fitted Obs. Fitted
Age<50 years 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Age≥50 years 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
High education 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Youngest child aged < 3 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05
3 ≤ Youngest child aged <6 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
II: Transition rate into employment
Single women Married women Single men Married men
Obs. Fitted Obs. Fitted Obs. Fitted Obs. Fitted
Age<50 years 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10
Age≥50 years 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
High education 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.06
Youngest child aged < 3 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
3 ≤ Youngest child aged <6 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05
III: Part-time employment rate for previously employed women
Single women Married women
Obs. Fitted Obs. Fitted
Age<50 years 0.21 0.20 0.52 0.53
Age≥50 years 0.21 0.17 0.57 0.59
High education 0.19 0.22 0.43 0.53
Youngest child aged < 3 0.52 0.43 0.76 0.79
3 ≤ Youngest child aged <6 0.67 0.66 0.79 0.81
IV: Employment effect of unemployment insurance
Women Men
Obs. Fitted Obs. Fitted
0.94 0.73 0.64 0.76
V: Joint leisure time and between-spouse wage correlation in married households
Obs. Fitted
Between-spouse leisure corr. 0.29 0.25
Wife non-emp. and husband emp. 0.21 0.21
Wage correlation 0.16 0.13
VI: Saving rates and social assistance receipt rates
Single women Single men Married households
Obs. Fitted Obs. Fitted Obs. Fitted
Saving rate: Age<50 years 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15
Saving rate: Age≥50 years 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11
Saving rate: High education 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.17
Social assistance receipt rate 0.22 0.22 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08
VII: Wage regressions (Reg) and summary of wage residuals (Res)
Women Men
Obs. Fitted Obs. Fitted
Reg: Intercept 2.38 2.39 2.67 2.67
Reg: Experience/40 0.37 0.30 0.21 0.21
Reg: High education 0.34 0.31 0.42 0.39
Res: Corr(predicted emp,residual) 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.00
Res: P(shock) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Res: P(good shock)-P(bad shock) 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01
Res: Shock size 0.64 0.63 0.57 0.61
Res: Var(wage measurement error) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Note: See Table 3 for a description of the auxiliary model.
Table 14: Internal goodness of fit
51
Unemployment insurance Social assistance
Observed Fitted Observed Fitted
Single woman 0.21 0.14 0.43 0.51
Single man 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.08
Married woman 0.23 0.40 0.25 0.20
Married man 0.41 0.34 0.25 0.20
Age (years) 47.12 50.95 41.21 40.64
High education 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.08
Youngest child aged < 3 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.11
3 ≤ Youngest child aged <6 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.06
Table 15: Characteristics of unemployment insurance and social assistance recepiants
D Welfare Decomposition: Further Details
In this appendix, we provide formal definitions of the welfare components that appear in (25)
in Section 7.1.
Consumption Level Effect
The consumption level effect γA,CL, solves:
VB(γA,CL) = VB((mA −mB)/mB), (28)
where VB() was defined in (24) and me denotes average household consumption in environ-
ment e. It is immediate that γA,CL = (mA −mB)/mB, i.e., the consumption level effect is
equal to the fractional change in aggregate consumption.
Consumption Inequality Effect
The consumption inequality effect, γA,CI , solves:
VB(γA,CL + γA,CI) = E
Υ TF∑
τ=ti
δτ−tiUF (mBi,j,τ (mA,i/mB,i), d
B
i,τ , d
B
j,τ , s
B
i,τ ) +
+(1−Υ)
TM∑
τ=tj
δτ−tjUM(mBi,j,τ (mA,j/mB,j), d
B
i,τ , d
B
j,τ , s
B
j,τ )
 , (29)
where me,i and me,j denote woman i’s and man j’s average consumption per period in
environment e.
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Consumption Uncertainty Effect
The consumption uncertainty effect, γA,CU , solves:
VB(γA,CL + γA,CI + γA,CU) = E
Υ TF∑
τ=ti
δτ−tiUF (mAi,j,τ , d
B
i,τ , d
B
j,τ , s
B
i,τ ) +
+(1−Υ)
TM∑
τ=tj
δτ−tjUM(mAi,j,τ , d
B
i,τ , d
B
j,τ , s
B
j,τ )
 . (30)
Note, the right hand side of (30) is evaluated using consumption in the alternative environ-
ment and employment and search effort in the baseline environment.
Employment Effect
The employment effect, γA,E, solves:
VB(γA,CL + γA,CI + γA,CU + γA,E) = E
Υ TF∑
τ=ti
δτ−tiUF (mAi,j,τ , d
A
i,τ , d
A
j,τ , s
B
i,τ ) +
+(1−Υ)
TM∑
τ=tj
δτ−tjUM(mAi,j,τ , d
A
i,τ , d
A
j,τ , s
B
j,τ )
 . (31)
Note, the right hand side of (31) is evaluated using consumption and employment in the
alternative environment and search effort in the baseline environment.
Search Cost Effect
The search cost effect, γA,S, is the welfare effect of the final step to the alternative environ-
ment, where search effort is updated. γA,E is therefore equal to the difference between the
total welfare effect of the policy change and the sum of the four welfare components defined
above.
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In this web appendix we provide further details that were omitted from the main text
to conserve space. Web Appendix A describes how taxes and benefits changed during the
sample period 1991–2004 and shows that the behavioral effects of these changes are modest.
Web Appendix B describes how we solve the model to derive optimal behavior over the life
cycle. Web Appendix C demonstrates the comparability of our SOEP and EVS samples.
Web Appendix D includes graphs that provided further details about results in the main
text. Web Appendix E shows that our findings on the optimal mix and optimal generosity
of unemployment insurance and social assistance are robust to including equilibrium effects.
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Web Appendix A Taxes and Benefits 1991–2004
Web Appendix A.I Income Tax
Figure A.1 shows the income tax schedules for single households without children and married
households over the sample period 1991–2004. Income tax varied little across years for
individuals earning below average level of individual earnings of 30,608 euros per year. At
high levels of earnings there were larger changes in taxation. Five factors account for the
illustrated changes. First, an income tax reform in 1996 reduced the average income tax rates
faced by very low earning households. Second, an income tax reform in 2000 reduced average
income tax rates for high earning households. Third, the solidarity surcharge fluctuated
between 0% and 7.5% of income tax (excluding social security contributions). Fourth, the
contribution rates for health and retirement benefits increased and the threshold above which
earnings are exempt from social security contributions also increased (these increases partly
offset the effects of the year 2000 tax reform). Fifth, there were incremental changes in the
parameters of the tax system that did not match exactly the rate of inflation.
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Figure A.1: Income tax schedules 1991–2004
Web Appendix A.II Unemployment Insurance & Social Assistance
The year 2000 unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance replacement rates
applied from 1994 onwards and the year 2000 unemployment insurance entitlement period
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applied from 1997 onwards. During the period 1991–1993 slightly higher replacement rates
applied: 63% for unemployment insurance and 56% for unemployment assistance if there
were no children in the individual’s household or 68% for unemployment insurance and 58%
for unemployment assistance if one or more children resided in the individual’s household.
Prior to 1997 the initial unemployment insurance entitlement period was slightly longer for
individuals entering employment at ages 42–46, 49–52, and 54–57 years (see Figure A.2(a)).
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Note: Initial entitlement periods are rounded down to the nearest integer multiple of three months. Social
assistance benefits are expressed in year 2000 prices.
Figure A.2: Initial unemployment insurance entitlement period and non-housing social as-
sistance 1991–2004
Regarding social assistance, recall from Section 2.3.2 that the social assistance income
floor is equal to the product of a generosity parameter and a household equivalence scale.
The generosity parameter, in turn, comprises a component for non-housing assistance and a
component for housing (see footnote 19). The policy on support for housing costs did not
change during the sample period and, therefore, we assume that this component of the social
assistance income floor increased with inflation. Figure A.2(b) illustrates the evolution of
the non-housing component of the social assistance income floor during the sample period.
The changes in non-housing benefits were modest, reflecting that throughout the sample
period non-housing benefits were calculated to ensure that all households could obtain a
basic standard of living. Furthermore, the equivalence scale did not change during the
sample period. In summary, during the sample period, there were no major changes to
social assistance and only modest changes to unemployment insurance.
Web Appendix A.III Behavioral Effects of Tax & Benefit Changes
We explore the behavioral effects of the changes in taxes and benefits that occurred during
the sample period by simulating behavior from the life-cycle model under each of the four-
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teen year-specific tax and benefit systems. Throughout this exercise, we use the parameter
estimates reported in Section 6.1. Table A.1 shows that the predicted voluntary quit rate,
transition rate into employment, saving rate, and social assistance receipt rate vary little
with the year-specific rules. This supports using the year 2000 rules for the entire sample
period.
Year
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
Voluntary quit rate at age<50 years
Single women 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Single men 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Married women 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Married men 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transition rate into employment at age<50 years
Single women 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Single men 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Married women 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Married Men 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Saving rate at age<50 years
Single women 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Single men 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16
Married households 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Social assistance receipt rate
Single women 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.21
Single men 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
Married households 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
Note: Each column summarizes behavior simulated from the life-cycle model with the year-
specific tax and benefit rules and the parameter estimates reported in Section 6.1.
Table A.1: Robustness of behavior to changes in the tax and benefit rules
Web Appendix B Optimal Life-cycle Behavior
We solve the model by characterizing optimal life-cycle behavior using the value functions
for single and married women and men. Recall a household’s choice problem ends when the
youngest household member reaches the compulsory retirement age of 65 years. From this
time onward, the household members cannot search or work, and the household consumes
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pension and social assistance benefits plus the actuarially fair annuity value of household
wealth at the compulsory retirement age. In each period prior to the compulsory retirement
age a household’s optimization problem proceeds in two stages. First, the search intensity of
each household member is optimized. Second, job offers arrive and the household optimizes
household consumption, household social assistance claiming behavior, and labor supply
behavior of each household member. This within-period problem is solved backwards: we
determine optimal consumption, social assistance claiming, and labor supply behavior for
each possible set of feasible labor supply choices, and then solve for the optimal search inten-
sity, taking into account the effect of search on the probability of employment constraints.
Before proceeding, we define the state variables for women and men. A woman’s state
space, Φi,t, contains the following individual characteristics: age; education; experience; per-
sistent wage type; unemployment insurance eligibility; unemployment insurance entitlement
period; unemployment assistance eligibility; hours of work in previous employment; labor
supply state in the previous period; job destruction status; household wealth; current period
preference shocks; and the age of the first-born child. A man’s state space, Φj,t, contains the
same variables that appear in a woman’s state space except for hours of work in previous
employment and the age of the first-born child.
Web Appendix B.I Single Households
We first consider the problem facing a single woman. A single woman’s choice problem ends
when she reaches the compulsory retirement age of 65 years. We denote this time by T˜ . The
terminal value function for single woman i is given by:
V Fs
T˜
(Φi,T˜ ) = E
 TF∑
τ=T˜
δτ−tUF (mi,∅,T˜ , di,T˜ , d∅,T˜ , si,T˜ , SAClaim
∗
i,∅,T˜ )
∣∣∣∣∣∣Φi,T˜
 . (A1)
In (A1), mi,∅,T˜ denotes the woman’s consumption in retirement, di,T˜ takes the value RT ,
indicating that the woman is retired, d∅,T˜ denotes the absence of a husband, si,T˜ is equal to
zero, reflecting that retired individuals cannot not search, SAClaim∗
i,∅,T˜ denotes the social as-
sistance claiming choice that maximizes the woman’s remaining lifetime utility, Φi,T˜ denotes
the values of the woman’s state variables at the compulsory retirement age, and T F denotes
the last period of the woman’s life. Based on the German Human Mortality Database we
estimate that T F is equal to 79.5 (and for men we estimate that TM is equal to 73.25).
Prior to the compulsory retirement age, the labor supply-specific value functions for single
Web Appendix, p. 5
woman i at time t are given by:
V Fst (d|s,Φi,t) = max
m,SAClaim
{
UF (m, d, d∅,t, s, SAClaim) +
δE
[
(1− φFsi,t+1)V Fst+1(Φi,t+1) + φFsi,t+1V Fct+1(Φi,t+1,Φj,t+1)
∣∣∣Φi,t, d]} for d ∈ DF . (A2)
In the above, φFsi,t+1 is the woman’s probability of marrying at time t+1, and V
Fc
t+1(Φi,t+1,Φj,t+1)
is woman’s value function in the next period if she marries (the value functions for married
individuals are defined below in Web Appendix B.II). Note, for each labor supply-specific
value function, consumption, m, and social assistance claiming, SAClaim, are optimized
conditional on the woman’s labor supply state. The optimization of consumption is sub-
ject to the intertemporal budget constraint and the non-negativity constraint on household
wealth. The expectation in (A2) is evaluated assuming that individuals’ expectations about
the observable characteristics of future spouses reflect the modal in-sample pattern of mar-
riage matching: an individual expects that his or her future spouse will enter the marriage
with the same education, employment status, and unemployment insurance entitlement and
eligibility as him or herself; individuals expect that the husband will enter the marriage with
7% more experience and 5% more wealth than the wife. We also assume individuals expect
any future spouse to enter the marriage with the same wage unobservable as themself.
We now characterize a single woman’s optimal labor supply behavior given the set of
feasible choices, as determined by the outcome of search activities, job destructions, and the
age-based restrictions on retirement eligibility. Let DFk for k = 1, ..., K
F denote all possible
sets of feasible labor supply choices. Given the set of feasible choices DFk , the single woman
chooses the labor supply alternative with the highest choice-specific value function:
d∗i,t(D
F
k ) = argmax
d∈DFk
{
V Fst (d|s,Φi,t)
}
. (A3)
The single woman’s optimal search intensity, s∗i,t, is given by:
s∗i,t = argmax
s∈[0,1/χi,t]

KF∑
k=1
P (DFk |s,Φi,t)V Fst
(
d∗i,t (D
F
k )
∣∣ s,Φi,t)
 , (A4)
where P (DFk |s,Φi,t) is the probability of the set DFk of feasible labor supply choices given
search intensity s. Note, as search intensity, s, varies P (DFk |s,Φi,t) changes according to the
effect of search on the probability of receiving a job offer as described by (17). Evaluating
the term in braces in (A4) at the optimal search intensity, s∗i,t, obtains the single woman’s
value function, V Fst (Φi,t).
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A single man’s value function, V Mst (Φj,t), is obtained in the same way as shown here
for a single woman. We assume than a single man expects his any future wife to enter the
marriage without preexisting children.
Web Appendix B.II Married Households
We now turn to the problem facing a married household. A married household’s choice
problem ends when the wife reaches the compulsory retirement age, i.e., at time T˜ . The
terminal value function for woman i in married household (i, j) is given by:
V Fc
T˜
(Φi,T˜ ,Φj,T˜ ) = E
 TF∑
τ=T˜
δτ−T˜UF (mi,j,T˜ , di,T˜ , dj,T˜ , si,T˜ , SAClaim
∗
i,j,T˜
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Φi,T˜ ,Φj,T˜
 , (A5)
and the terminal value function for man j in married household (i, j) is given by:
V Mc
T˜
(Φi,T˜ ,Φj,T˜ ) = E
 TM∑
τ=T˜
δτ−T˜UM(mi,j,T˜ , di,T˜ , dj,T˜ , sj,T˜ , SAClaim
∗
i,j,T˜
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Φi,T˜ ,Φj,T˜
 . (A6)
In the two above equations, mi,j,T˜ denotes the household’s consumption in retirement, di,T˜
and dj,T˜ take the value RT , indicating that both spouses are retired, si,T˜ and sj,T˜ are equal
to zero, reflecting that retired individuals do not search, and SAClaim∗
i,j,T˜
denotes the social
assistance claiming choice that maximizes the household’s remaining lifetime utility. The
married household’s objective function is an α-weighted average of the spouses’ payoffs and,
therefore, the terminal value function for the married household is given by:
V FM(Φi,T˜ ,Φj,T˜ ) = αV
Fc
T˜
(Φi,T˜ ,Φj,T˜ ) + (1− α)V McT˜ (Φi,T˜ ,Φj,T˜ ). (A7)
The labor supply-specific value functions for the married household prior to the wife
reaching the compulsory retirement age are given by:
V FMt (d
F , dM |sF , sM ,Φi,t,Φj,t) = max
m,SAClaim
{
αUF (m, dF , dM , sF , SAClaim)
+(1− α)UM(m, dF , dM , sM , SAClaim)
+δE
[
(1− φci,j,t+1)
(
αV Fst+1(Φi,t+1) + (1− α)V Mst+1 (Φj,t+1)
)
+φci,j,t+1V
FM
t+1 (Φi,t+1,Φj,t+1)
∣∣∣Φi,t,Φj,t, dF , dM]}
for dF ∈ DF and dM ∈ DM . (A8)
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In the above, φci,j,t+1 is the probability that the spouses remain married between periods
t and t + 1. Similar to single households, consumption, m, and social assistance claiming,
SAClaim, are optimized conditional on household labor supply. V Fst+1(Φi,t+1) and V
Ms
t+1 (Φj,t+1)
are the wife’s and husband’s value functions in the next period if they divorce (the value
function for single individuals were defined above in Web Appendix B.I). van der Klaauw
and Wolpin (2008) and Ferna´ndez and Wong (2014) use similar preference specifications
for couples in studies of, respectively, the effect of Social Security on household retirement
behavior and the effect of divorce risk on female labor force participation.
Let Dck for k = 1, ..., K
c denote all possible sets of feasible labor supply choices for a
married household. Given the set of feasible labor supply choices Dck, the household chooses
the labor supply alternative with the highest choice-specific value function:
(d∗i,t(D
c
k), d
∗
j,t(D
c
k)) = argmax
(dF ,dM )∈Dck
V FMt
(
dF , dM |sF , sM ,Φi,t,Φj,t
)
. (A9)
The wife’s and husband’s optimal search intensities are given by:
(s∗i,t, s
∗
j,t) = argmax
sF ∈ [0, 1/χi,t]
sM ∈ [0, 1/χj,t]
{
Kc∑
k=1
P (Dck|sF , sM)V FMt (d∗i,t(Dck), d∗j,t(Dck) | sF , sM ,Φi,t,Φj,t)
}
,(A10)
where P (Dck|sF , sM) is the probability of choice set Dck, given search intensities sF for the
wife and sM for the husband. Last, we split the married household’s value function into the
value functions for the wife and husband that appear in the single household’s optimization
problem. For a married woman:
V Fct (Φi,t,Φj,t) =
Kc∑
k=1
P (Dck|s∗i,t, s∗j,t)V Fct
(
d∗i,t(D
c
k), d
∗
j,t(D
c
k)
∣∣ s∗i,t, s∗j,t,Φi,t,Φj,t) , (A11)
where
V Fct
(
d∗i,t(D
c
k), d
∗
j,t(D
c
k)
∣∣ s∗i,t, s∗j,t,Φi,t,Φj,t) = UF (m∗, d∗i,t(Dck), d∗j,t(Dck), s∗i,t, SAClaim∗)
+δE
[
(1− φct+1)V Fst+1(Φi,t+1) + φct+1V Fct+1(Φi,t+1,Φj,t+1)
∣∣∣Φi,t,Φj,t, d∗i,t(Dck), d∗j,t(Dck)](A12)
and m∗ and SAClaim∗ denote optimal household consumption and optimal social assistance
claiming from (A8). The value function for a married man is derived in the same way as
shown here for a married woman.
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Web Appendix C Sample Comparability
We examine the comparability of the SOEP and EVS samples described in Section 4 by
comparing the average values of demographic characteristics, employment and retirement
outcomes, and wealth across the two samples. Table A.2 shows that the EVS and SOEP
samples are highly comparable. In particular, the rates of employment, non-employment,
and retirement are similar across the two samples, both overall and when we split by gender
and marital status. The same is true for age, eduction, the age category of the youngest
child, and wealth.
Variable
All individuals Single women Single men Married women Married men
SOEP EVS SOEP EVS SOEP EVS SOEP EVS SOEP EVS
Share 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.37
Age (years) 44.70 44.09 43.38 43.64 41.18 40.64 44.28 43.30 47.03 46.01
High education 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.17
Child 0–3 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.02 - - 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11
Child 3–6 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.03 - - 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10
Wealth (Euros) 119,986 126,147 52,775 59,579 56,445 70,826 147,955 149,845 147,955 149,845
Part-time employed 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.21 - - 0.33 0.33 - -
Full-time employed 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.78 0.79 0.26 0.24 0.74 0.78
Retired 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.07
Non Employed 0.24 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.35 0.40 0.17 0.15
Note: For all variables except wealth, we use the full EVS sample, which covers the years 1998 and 2003,
and a SOEP sub-sample that includes only observations from the years 1998 and 2003. For wealth, we
use the EVS sub-sample that includes only observations from the year 2003 and a SOEP sub-sample that
includes only observations from the year 2002 (since wealth was only observed in the SOEP in 2002). Wealth
comprises financial, housing, and durable assets, is measured at the household level, and is expressed in year
2000 prices using the Consumer Price Index. See the notes to Table 1 for further variable definitions. All
statistics are weighted using the household weights supplied by the SOEP or EVS.
Table A.2: Comparison of the SOEP and EVS samples
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Web Appendix D Further Graphs
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Figure A.3: Tax function approximation
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Figure A.4: Welfare effects of unemployment insurance when the generosity of social assis-
tance is 5% and 10% of the baseline level
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Note: Consumption uncertainty and consumption inequality are taken directly from the welfare decomposi-
tion in Section 7.1. Moral hazard is defined as the sum of the consumption level, employment, and search
cost effects in the welfare decomposition. Social assistance is set to the baseline generosity (100% of the year
2000 level). Tax progressivity is as in the baseline and the average tax rate is adjusted to generate the same
net government revenue as in the baseline. For comparability, welfare gains are normalized to zero at an
unemployment insurance replacement rate of 60%.
Figure A.5: Moral hazard, consumption uncertainty, and consumption inequality effects of
unemployment insurance when households cannot save
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Note: Consumption uncertainty is defined in the welfare decomposition in Section 7.1. At each value of
the unemployment insurance replacement rate, social assistance is set to the optimal generosity shown in
Panel II of Table 12 and the average tax rate is adjusted to generate the same net government revenue as in
the estimated life-cycle model with the baseline policy environment. Removing husband-provided childcare
from the family model has a negligible effect on consumption uncertainty and therefore is omitted from the
presentation.
Figure A.6: Decomposing the consumption uncertainty effect of unemployment insurance
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Web Appendix E Equilibrium Effects
In this appendix, we propose an extension to our baseline model that captures the equilibrium
effects of changes in unemployment insurance and social assistance. We use the extended
model to explore how our main conclusions may be affected by equilibrium effects. In
summary, we continue to find that the optimal social safety net is dominated by social
assistance.
Lalive et al. (2015) explain that the total effect, or macro effect, of a change in the design
of unemployment insurance is the sum of a micro effect and an externality effect. The micro
effect is the change in labor market outcomes due to changes in job search behavior at the
individual level. This is already included in our baseline model. The externality effect arises
from changes in the equilibrium conditions in the labor market that affect an individual’s
job finding probability given their search behavior. More generous unemployment insurance
creates externalities through two channels. First, as unemployment insurance becomes more
generous there is less competition for jobs and, therefore, a worker’s probability of receiving
a job offer at any given level of search effort increases. Second, more generous unemployment
insurance strengthens the bargaining position of workers, driving up wages and leading firms
to scale back job creation; this decreases a worker’s probability of receiving a job offer at
any given level of search effort. Lalive et al. (2015) study the equilibrium effects of the
Regional Extension Benefit Program in Austria, which gave eligible unemployed workers an
extra three years of benefits. They find that unemployment durations for ineligible workers
decreased by 6–8 weeks with no change in reemployment wages. The externality effect of the
unemployment benefit extension on ineligible workers made the macro effect of the benefit
extension on unemployment durations around 21% smaller than the micro effect. Lalive
et al. (2015)’s findings are consistent with the small related literature on this topic. Using
data from an online job posting board in the US, Marinescu (2017) finds no effect of the
potential duration of unemployment insurance benefits on posted wages, which is further
evidence of against an equilibrium effect on wages. Levine (1993) and Marinescu (2017)
report differences between the micro and macro effects of unemployment insurance that are
similar to the findings of Lalive et al. (2015).
We explore how our results may be affected by equilibrium effects by recalculating the
optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance while
allowing search productivity to vary the generosity of unemployment insurance and social
assistance. Specifically, we augment equation (18) in Section 3.2 to allow search produc-
tivity to depend on the generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance. The
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augmented search productivity for women, χi,t, is given by:
log(χi,t) = χ
F
1 + χ
F
2 AgeG50i,t + χ
F
3 HiEduci + χ
F
4 Marriedi,t + µ log(G
e/G0), (A13)
where Ge is benefit generosity in the policy environment under study, G0 is benefit generosity
in the baseline policy environment, and µ is the elasticity of search productivity with respect
to benefit generosity. Benefit generosity is defined as the sum of the social assistance income
floor and the unemployment insurance benefit for an individual with average earnings. The
corresponding augmented search productivity for men is obtained by replacing F with M
and i with j in (A13). We match findings of Lalive et al. (2015) by calibrating an elasticity
of search productivity with respect to benefit generosity such that the equilibrium effect
explains 21% of the employment effect of moving from the baseline policy environment to
the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance. In
more detail, Panel II of Table A.3 shows that employment increases by 3.68% when we move
from the baseline environment shown in column (1) to the optimal mix and optimal generos-
ity of unemployment insurance and social assistance in column (2) (columns (1) and (2) in
Table A.3 repeat the baseline and optimal mix and optimal generosity results from Table 9
in Section 7.2). We find that an elasticity of search productivity with respect of benefit gen-
erosity of 0.075 attenuates the employment effect of this policy change from 3.68% to 2.92%,
i.e, a 21% decrease as found by Lalive et al. (2015). Column (3) shows outcomes under the
optimal policy in column (2) but with the calibrated equilibrium effect on search productiv-
ity. The equilibrium effect reduces net government revenue by an average of 2,455 euros per
person or 1.41% of baseline net government revenue. The equilibrium effect decreases the
welfare gain of moving to the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insur-
ance and social assistance from 2.20% to 1.01% of baseline consumption, reflecting that the
lower benefit generosity under the optimal policy creates a negative externality on search
productivity. However, because the equilibrium effect reduces net government revenue, the
welfare gains in column (3) do not fully capture the welfare impact of the equilibrium effect.
Column (4) Table A.3 shows the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment
insurance and social assistance when the optimal policy calculation incorporates the micro
and equilibrium effects of policy changes. We identify the optimal policy by jointly choosing
the unemployment insurance replacement rate, social assistance income floor, and the av-
erage tax rate to maximize welfare while accounting for the calibrated equilibrium effect of
benefit generosity on search productivity and subject to generating the same net government
revenue as in the baseline policy environment. We continue to find that the optimal mix
is dominated by social assistance. However, the introduction of equilibrium effects leads to
Web Appendix, p. 15
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I: Policy environment (* denotes a parameter that has been optimized to maximize welfare)
Unemployment insurance replacement rate (%) 60 0∗ 0 20∗
Social assistance income floor (% of baseline) 100 105∗ 105 110∗
Average tax rate (τ0) 0.42 0.39
∗ 0.39 0.40∗
Equilibrium effect on search productivity No No Yes Yes
Change in net government revenue (% of baseline) - 0.00 -1.41 0.00
II: Behaviors
Wealth (euros per household) 94,853 100,864 100,490 95,740
Employment rate 0.647 0.671 0.666 0.658
% Change in employment from baseline 3.68 2.92 1.78
III: Welfare effects
Welfare gain (% of baseline consumption) – 2.20 1.01 0.85
Welfare decomposition:
Consumption level effect – 3.63 3.09 1.27
Consumption inequality effect – -0.20 -0.25 -0.04
Consumption uncertainty effect – -0.24 -0.39 0.28
Employment effect – -1.43 -1.54 -1.09
Search cost effect – 0.44 0.10 0.42
Note: Columns (1)–(2) repeat columns (1) and (5) in Table 9. Column (1) summarizes the
baseline environment. Column (2) shows outcomes when unemployment insurance replace-
ment rate, social assistance income floor, and the average tax rate (τ0) are jointly chosen to
maximize welfare subject to generating the same net government revenue as in the baseline
(without equilibrium effects). Column (3) shows outcomes under the optimal policy identified
in column (2) but with an equilibrium effect that leads the productivity of job search to increase
with the generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance (generosity is defined as
the sum of the social assistance income floor and the unemployment insurance benefit for a
individual with the average level of earnings). We calibrate the size of the equilibrium effect to
match the findings of Lalive et al. (2015) and this gives an elasticity of search productivity with
respect to benefit generosity of 0.075. Column (4) shows outcomes when the unemployment
insurance replacement rate, social assistance income floor, and the average tax rate (τ0) are
jointly chosen to maximize welfare while accounting for the calibrated equilibrium effect of
benefit generosity on search productivity and subject to generating the same net government
revenue as in the baseline. In (1) households face the year 2000 tax system while in (2)–(4)
they face a tax system with the year 2000 progressivity and the average tax rate resulting from
the respective welfare maximization problem. See the notes to Table 9 for variable definitions.
Table A.3: Robustness of the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment
insurance and social assistance to equilibrium effects
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two changes in the optimal policy. First, the optimal generosity of social assistance increases
slightly from 105% to 110% of the baseline generosity. Second, the optimal unemployment
insurance replacement rate increases from 0% to 20%. The higher optimal generosities of
social assistance and unemployment insurance reflect that the equilibrium effect leads to
additional welfare gains from generous benefits via higher returns to search effort.
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